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JURISDICTION 
 
 This is an appeal from summary judgment. Jurisdiction lies pursuant to Utah Code 
§78A-3-102(3)(j). 
ISSUE, STANDARD AND PRESERVATION 
 
 On March 27, 1902, and subject to a never satisfied condition precedent, several 
individuals began incorporating Minnie Maud Reservoir and Irrigation Company, starting 
with Articles of Incorporation. (R(2)-802–07)(Addendum 2).1 The agreed purpose, 
typical for mutual irrigation companies, was to construct “reservoirs . . . and other means 
of controlling and distributing water for irrigation . . . to the stockholders . . . .” (Id.). The 
parties agreed that “[Minnie Maud] shall and does hereby purchase, take, receive and 
hold all the water rights now held and claimed by the several incorporators hereto, of and 
to the waters of said Minnie Maud Creek . . . .” (R(2)-805). Six weeks later, May 12, 
1902, several nascent Minnie Maud shareholders conveyed water rights to Minnie Maud 
(the “Deed”) (R(2)-1279)(Addendum 3).  
Minnie Maud’s corporate existence was conditional: “This corporation shall not be 
effective for any of the purposes mentioned herein until at least 3000 shares of the unpaid 
portion of capital stock shall have been subscribed.” (“Share Requirement”)(Id.). It is 
undisputed that only 2,377 shares issued. (R. 1663). 
                                                 
1 The record in this case consists of two discs. The first disc contains documents 
numbered 1-4532. The second disc contains documents numbered 1-2224. All citations to 
the record will indicate the disc followed by the page citation, i.e., (R(1)-500) is a citation 
to page 500 on the first disc. 
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The state engineer issued a proposed determination (PD) in 1964 in which Minnie 
Maud is identified as the owner of a series of irrigation water rights. (“Water 
Rights”)(R(2)-1015–32). Several water users objected to the PD, claiming that (1) Minnie 
Maud did not exist due to the unsatisfied Share Requirement, and (2) the company did 
not control or distribute water. (“Objections”)(R(2)-1052–66).2  
The district court ruled on summary judgment that the (attempted) conveyance of 
water rights to Minnie Maud (the Deed), alone, waived the Share Requirement, meaning 
that the PD correctly identified Minnie Maud as the owner of the Water Rights. (R(2)-
1673–74).  
The issue, preserved at R(2)-1398–1400, 1620–22, 2181, 2202–03, is whether the 
district court erred when deciding as a matter of law that the Deed, dated just six weeks 
after the Articles, waived the Share Requirement in light of the known, undisputed 
circumstances concerning Minnie Maud’s conditional existence and limited function. 
Standard: Summary judgment is reviewed for correctness. Delta Canal Co. v. 
Frank Vincent Family Ranch, LLC, 2013 UT 69, ¶10, --- P.3d ---, or “de novo.” Bahr v. 
Imus, 2011 UT 19, ¶16, 250 P.3d 56. The issues on appeal are legal, requiring this Court 
to “determine only whether the trial court erred in applying the governing law and 
whether the trial court correctly held that there were no disputed issues of material fact.” 
Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 438 (Utah 1996)(citations omitted). On the factual 
element, summary judgment should be denied “if the facts shown by the evidence . . . 
                                                 
2 The objections sat pending until EnerVest’s predecessor initiated this action under Utah 
Code §73-4-24. (R(1)-4085–154). 
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support more than one plausible but conflicting inference on a pivotal issue . . . .” Uintah 
Basin Med. Ctr. v. Hardy, 2008 UT 15, ¶19, 179 P.3d 786 (first omission in 
original)(citation omitted). A reasonable inference exists when “there is at least a 
foundation in the evidence upon which the ultimate conclusion is based,” while “in the 
case of speculation, there is no underlying evidence to support the conclusion.” Harding 
v. Atlas Title Ins. Agency, Inc., 2012 UT App 236, ¶7, 285 P.3d 1260. “[A]ny doubt 
concerning questions of fact, including evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from 
the evidence, should be resolved in favor of the [party opposing summary judgment].”3 
Beehive Brick Co. v. Robinson Brick Co., 780 P.2d 827, 831 (Utah App. 1989). 
The district court decided the case based on waiver, (R(2)-1673–74), typically “a 
mixed question of law and fact.” United Park City Mines Co. v. Stitching Mayflower Mtn. 
Fonds, 2006 UT 35, ¶21, 140 P.3d 1200. “[W]hether the trial court employed the proper 
standard of waiver presents a legal question . . . reviewed for correctness . . . .” Pledger v. 
Gillespie, 1999 UT 54, ¶16, 982 P.2d 572 (Utah 1999).  
                                                 
3 The court decided cross motions, granting Carlson’s and denying EnerVest’s and 
Hammerschmid’s. (R(2)-1661–78).  
Cross-motions for summary judgment do not ipso facto dissipate factual 
issues, even though both parties contend . . . that they are entitled to prevail 
because there are no material issues of fact. Rather, cross-motions may be 
viewed as involving a contention by each movant that no genuine issue of 
fact exists under the theory it advances, but not as a concession that no 
dispute remains under the theory advanced by its adversary. In effect, each 
cross-movant implicitly contends that it is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law, but that if the court determines otherwise, factual disputes exist 
which preclude judgment as a matter of law in favor of the other side.  
Wycalis v. Guardian Title, 780 P.2d 821, 824–25 (Utah App. 1989)(omission in 
original)(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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When implied based on a “course of conduct,” “waiver is a fact-intensive mixed 
question.” Lane Myers Constr., LLC v. Nat’l City Bank, 2014 UT 58, ¶49, 342 P.3d 749 
(Durham, J., concurring)(citations omitted). If based on a “writing, and no extrinsic 
evidence of the meaning of ambiguous terms is presented, waiver is a question of law that 
may be resolved on summary judgment.” Id. (citations omitted). Here, the district court 
inferred waiver from the Deed alone.4 (R(2)-1673–74). “The de novo standard [of 
review] . . . applies regardless of the nature (fact-intensive or not) of the underlying law 
governing the parties’ rights.” Bahr, 2011 UT 19, ¶16 (emphasis omitted). 
CASE AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
 
 This action is brought under Utah Code §73-4-24, permitting an expedited hearing 
on the Objections made under §73-4-11.5 Under Utah Code §§73-4-1 and 73-4-3, water 
rights in a given source are determined en masse. Water right claims are submitted, 
followed by the State Engineer’s hydrographic survey showing water diversion and use, 
followed by the state engineer’s proposed determination of the rights (“PD”). The PD is a 
“recommendation” to the district court “of all rights to the use of water of the river 
system or water source.” Id. §73-4-11(1), (2)(a). Objections to the PD are filed and 
decided. Id. §§73-4-11, -13 -15. The objections may be heard, as they were here, under 
§73-4-24. (R(2)-245–49, 262–65). 
                                                 
4 The waiver cases involving a “writing” concerned express lien waivers. Zions First 
Nat’l Bank v. Saxton, 493 P.2d 602, 603 (Utah 1972); Holbrook v. Webster’s Inc., 320 
P.2d 661, 663 (Utah 1958). 
5 The Petition that began this action under §73-4-24 contains a researched and so far, 
undisputed recitation of events, pieced together based on the extant record, explaining the 
general course of the larger general determination prior to this proceeding. (R(2)-4085–
4154). 
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The PD in this case, issued in 1964, identified Minnie Maud as the owner of the 
Water Rights, each of which had a distinct place of use and specific irrigated acres, not an 
allocation based on share ownership. (R(2)-1018 –32, 1586–93). The Objections were 
timely but were not pursued or otherwise decided until this proceeding.  
The district court ordered that the expedited hearing under §73-4-24 be limited to 
“the issues timely raised in the 1964 Objections . . . whether the . . . [PD]” correctly listed 
“Minnie Maud Reservoir and Irrigation Company as the owner of” the water rights. 
(R(2)-478). If the court determined that the PD was correct, “judgment will be entered 
and [the] Section 24 Hearing [would be] complete.” 6 (Id.) 
The district court entered summary judgment to that effect on January 5, 2016. 
(R(2)-1661–78, 1897–98)(Addendum 1). EnerVest timely appealed. (R(2)-1908–09).  
FACTS 
 
1. Undisputed Summary Judgment Facts 
The court entered summary judgment on January 5, 2016. (R(2)-1661–78). The 
following facts are verbatim from that ruling.  
In about March of 1902, some users of water from Minnie Maud Creek filed 
Articles of Incorporation with the State of Utah. (R(2)-1662). The Articles provide that 
“[Minnie Maud] shall and does hereby purchase, take, receive and hold all water rights 
now held and claimed by the several incorporators hereto, of and to the waters of said 
                                                 
6 The summary judgment is, therefore, not interlocutory, but is final and appealable. See 
Murdock v. Springville Mun. Corp., 878 P.2d 1147, 1149 (Utah 1994)(dismissal of 
petition filed pursuant to Utah Code §73-4-24 (prior version) was not an interlocutory 
order, but was appealable). 
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Minnie Maud Creek in Carbon County, Utah . . . .” (R(2)-805, 1662). In addition, the 
“[Water Rights] and canals now owned by the individual appropriators along [Minnie 
Maud] creek, who are incorporators hereto, . . . [are] conveyed by the respective owners 
thereof to this corporation for 2 thousand 3 hundred and 77 shares of stock . . . .” (R(2)-
806, 1662).  
The Articles state,  
That the said water rights and canals now owned by the individual 
appropriators along said creek, who are incorporators hereto, are reasonably 
worth the sum of Two Thousand Three Hundred and 77 dollars, and said 
property is conveyed by the respective owners thereof to this corporation 
for 2 thousand 3 hundred and 77 shares of stock at the par value thereof, 
issued to the owners and claimants in proportion to the value of their rights 
. . . .  
 
(Id.). 2,377 shares were issued for the Water Rights. (Id.). 
The Articles further provide that “[t]his corporation shall not be effective for any 
of the purposes mentioned herein until at least 3000 shares of the unpaid portion of the 
capital stock shall have been subscribed.” (Id.). The Articles state that only 2,377 shares 
of Minnie Maud stock were subscribed for and taken by the persons identified therein, 
including 260 shares being issued to T.F. Housekeeper. (R(2)-802, 806, 1663). 
The Articles state that “[t]he directors may sell [treasury stock] in payment of 
work done and for . . . the construction of reservoirs, canals, and other useful and 
necessary improvements to the irrigation system of Minnie Maud Creek.” (R(2)-806, 
1663). As set forth in the Articles, only 2,377 shares of stock in Minnie Maud were 
initially subscribed. (R(2)-1663). There is no direct evidence, either documentary or 
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testimonial, that Minnie Maud ever subscribed or issued any shares in addition to the 
original 2,377. (Id.). 
On April 11, 1902, the Utah Secretary of State issued a certificate of incorporation 
to Minnie Maud. The certificate reads, in part: 
and that there has also been filed in my office with said certificate, a copy 
of the articles of agreement; and oath or affirmation, certified by said Clerk; 
that said articles contain the statement of facts required by law, and that 
said corporation is hereby constituted a body corporate, with right of 
succession as specified in its said articles of agreement, and is hereby 
authorized to exercise all the functions, enjoy all the privileges of a 
Corporation, and to transact all business of said Corporation, and to transact 
all business of said Corporation, as specified in its said articles of 
agreement. 
 
(R(2)-1449, 1663). 
 
By a deed dated May 12, 1902, each of the incorporators conveyed all of his/her 
water rights on Minnie Maud Creek to Minnie Maud Reservoir and Irrigation Company. 
(R(2)-1279, 1663). Sometime before July 28, 1905, Minnie Maud filed an action “to 
determine and quiet its right to the waters of Minnie Maud creek, . . . and to enjoin 
[Martha Grames] from interfering with, or from diverting or using, or asserting any right 
to the use of [water from Minnie Maud Creek].” (R(2)-1043, 1663). The parties to that 
action were Minnie Maud and Martha Grames. (R(2)-1043, 1663–64). Martha Grames 
prevailed in the action. (R(2)-1043–45, 1664).  
The Court's decree does not purport to determine any water rights on Minnie 
Maud Creek other than between the parties to suit, namely, Grames and Minnie Maud. 
(R(2)-1664). Grames and the Minnie Maud organizers were not the only water users on 
Minnie Maud Creek at the time of suit. (See R(2)1307–08, 1664). 
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“Right after the company was organized, all the water users on Minnie Maud 
Creek went to work with hand tools, teams and scrapers to build the reservoir up Minnie 
Maud Canyon . . . .” (R(2)-843, 1664). The reservoir was completed in about 1905. (Id.). 
It washed out between 1911 and 1913. (R(2)-843–44, 988, 1664). The reservoir stored 
high water from Minnie Maud Creek when it was available. (R(2)-843–44, 988 1664). On 
one occasion, Ed Lee, one of the incorporators, asked David Anderson and Fred Grames 
to open the headgate on the reservoir to release water to Lee for his turn. (Id.). 
Anderson testified that he left the area in 1911 at the age of twenty-nine. (R(2)- 
843–44, 1664). Anderson declared that prior to his departure he was unaware of the 
existence of a water master and stated that the water users took their water from their own 
places of diversion. (Id.) The water was not regulated nor controlled by Minnie Maud. 
(Id.). 
Between 1902 and 1955, Minnie Maud conducted meetings and issued stock 
certificates. (R(2)-1664). On August 1, 1962, T. A. Christensen, purporting to act as a 
director of Minnie Maud, wrote a letter to the Utah State Engineer stating that Minnie 
Maud had subscribed a total of only 2,377 shares of stock. (R(2)-1358, 1665). There is no 
evidence that Minnie Maud attempted to transfer or convey the Water Rights to its 
shareholders or others. (R(2)-1665). 
The State Engineer issued the Proposed Determination in March, 1964, which 
listed Minnie Maud as the owner of the Water Rights. (R(2)-1015–32, 1665). In the fall 
of 1964, Bernard Iriart, Albert Thayn, William Dause, Amber Keel, Louis Motte, Clive 
and Myrtle Mae Sprouse, and Willis A. and Wilma Hammerschmid, filed objections to 
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the Proposed Determination. (R(2)-1052–66, 1665)(Addendum 6). A common element of 
the objections is the claim that the Proposed Determination was incorrect because it listed 
Minnie Maud as the owner of the Water Rights. (Id.). 
On October 1, 1964, Clive and Myrtle Sprouse and Willis and Wilma 
Hammerschmid filed an objection (the “Objection”) to the Proposed Determination. 
(R(2)-1062–66, 1665). The Hammerschmid Objection, which was verified by Willis 
Hammerschmid, provides that the Sprouses had contracted to sell the real property 
identified in the Proposed Determination to the Hammerschmids, “together with the 
water rights thereunto belonging including irrigation, domestic, cullinary [sic] and stock 
watering belonging to the said land.” (R(2)-1062, 1665). 
The Hammershmid Objectors challenged the State Engineer's proposal that title to 
the Water Rights be vested in Minnie Maud on several verified bases, including: 
a. The land, and the Water Rights applied to the land, belonged to the 
Objectors, not to Minnie Maud.  
b. Minnie Maud was defunct and non-existent, and had been so for many 
years.  
c. Minnie Maud failed to carry out the purpose for which it was purported to 
have been organized and never distributed water to the Objectors, to any of 
the stockholders or any of their predecessors-in-interest.  
d. Minnie Maud failed to build or maintain dams, canals or ditches to convey 
and distribute the water from Minnie Maud Creek.  
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e. Minnie Maud never levied assessments on or exercised jurisdiction or 
control over the water from Minnie Maud Creek.  
f. Water under the Water Rights has been diverted by the Objectors and their 
predecessors-in-interest from the natural channel by dams and ditches 
belonging to them and their predecessors-in-interest, and said water has 
been used by them and their predecessors-in-interest under claim of right 
upon their lands for irrigation and stock watering purposes without any 
control or supervision by Minnie Maud since at least 1918.  
g. Legal title to the water rights represented by Claim Nos. 188, 189 and 190 
has never been conveyed to Minnie Maud by the Objectors or any of their 
predecessors-in-interest. 
h. If Minnie Maud ever acquired or otherwise had any right, title or interest in 
or to the Water Rights, any such title was lost by the adverse use of the 
Objectors and their predecessors-in-interest. Since at least 1918, the 
Objectors and their predecessor put the water to beneficial use which was 
continuous, open, notorious and adverse to the purported rights of Minnie 
Maud.  
(R(2)-1062–64, 1666–67). 
On November 9, 1974, the Utah Secretary of State issued a Certificate of 
Involuntary Dissolution of Minnie Maud. (R(2)-1068, 1667). On June 28, 2000, Michael 
Carlson submitted a letter to the Utah Division of Water Rights (Division), agreeing that 
Minnie Maud “issued 2,377 shares of stock . . . .” (R(2)-956–60, 1667). 
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2. EnerVest’s Summary Judgment Motion7 
In 1950 and 1951, no shareholders attended Minnie Maud’s annual shareholder 
meeting. (R(2)-913). It did not hold an annual meeting in 1952 and 1953. Id. One 
shareholder attended in 1954. (Id.)  
On May 4, 1957, Ernest J. Davis filed a Complaint in the Seventh Judicial District 
Court for Carbon County (“1957 Complaint”)(R(2)-1351–56)(Addendum 4).8 The 1957 
Complaint named Thomas Christensen, Bud Christensen, T. F. Housekeeper, Louis 
Motte, Bernard Iriat, and Amber Keel. (Id.) 
The 1957 Complaint alleges: 
a. Minnie Maud was organized on March 27, 1902;  
b. Minnie Maud issued a total of 2,377 shares, held by the following parties in 
the following amounts: 
i. Ernest E. Davis, Jr. 1,429 shares 
ii. Thomas Christensen 199½ shares 
iii. Bud Christensen  199½ shares 
iv. T. F. Housekeeper 260 shares 
v. Louis Motte  68 shares 
vi. Bernard Iriat  39 shares 
vii. Amber Keel  182 shares 
 
(Id.)  
                                                 
7 Carlson did not dispute any of the facts in EnerVest’s motion. (R(2)-1430–33). See Utah 
R. Civ. P. 56(a)(4)(2014)(“Each material fact set forth in the motion . . . that is not 
disputed is deemed admitted for the purposes of the motion.”) These undisputed facts are 
verbatim (R(2)-888–91), except for omitted duplication with the district court ruling. 
8 The issue of Minnie Maud’s existence was not at issue in the 1957 Complaint. Davis 
alleged that the defendants were using more water than they were allocated. (R(2)-924–
25). Minnie Maud’s existence was not at issue until defendants’ affirmatively denied its 
existence in their answers. (R(2)-928–35, 1317–22). 
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Defendants each answered and averred that, because the Share Requirement was 
never met, Minnie Maud was never a valid corporation, and that their water rights were 
superior. 9 (R(2)-928–35, 1317–22)(Addendum 5).  
3. Additional Undisputed Facts 
Attorney D.A. Frandsen represented Amber Keel, Bernard Iriart, Albert Thayn, 
and William C. Dause in the general determination, and Louis Motte and Amber Keel in 
the 1957 case. (R(2)-928–35, 943–48). During a hearing in the general determination, the 
state engineer directed Frandsen to “check with some of the old timers regarding the 
construction and period of use of the reservoir built by [Minnie Maud].” (R(2)-985). 
Frandsen obtained two affidavits, from David Anderson and Sheridan Powell. (R(2)-985–
88).  
Both of these old timers had much to say about Minnie Maud, and what it did and 
did not do. The reservoir washed out around 1911-1913. (R(2)-843–44, 988). Minnie 
Maud did not distribute or otherwise control the water after that. (R(2)-844 (“The 
irrigation company never had a water master and all the water users took their own water 
from their own places of diversion and this water was never regulated or controlled by 
the irrigation company.”)). Minnie Maud did not replace the washed out dam. (R(2)-843–
44, 988). Rather, Powell rebuilt it himself and then obtained a right to store water in it. 
                                                 
9 Only Amber Keel’s answer was attached to EnerVest’s motion. (R(2)-928-35). The 
Housekeeper answer was attached to the Hammerschmid’s motion. (R(2)-828–33). The 
answers of Housekeeper, the Christensens, and Motte are practically identical in 
asserting, “[t]hat by reason of the fact that 3,000 shares of stock have never been 
subscribed in the corporation referred to in plaintiff’s Compliant, neither this defendant 
nor her predecessors have ever recognized the validity of said corporation or its right to 
exercise any corporate powers.” (R(2)-932).   
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(R(2)-988). Powell’s reservoir, with its 56.36 acre foot capacity, “is on the same site and 
has the same capacity as the old Minnie Maud . . . reservoir.” Id. Minnie Maud 
apparently had a “water master” prior to the washout. (R(2)-909). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The facts concerning the failed attempt to incorporate Minnie Maud are 
undisputed. That is, it is clear that several water users on Minnie Maud Creek drafted the 
Articles of Incorporation and subsequently attempted to convey their water rights to 
Minnie Maud. As a mutual irrigation company, Minnie Maud’s stated purpose was to 
control and distribute water to shareholders. 
But Minnie Maud’s incorporation—its power to function—was explicitly 
conditioned on a never satisfied condition precedent: “This corporation shall not be 
effective for any of the purposes mentioned herein until at least 3000 shares of the unpaid 
portion of capital stock shall have been subscribed.” (R(2)-806). The shareholders bound 
themselves to this Share Requirement. It was never satisfied, however. Only 2,377 shares 
ever issued. 
On summary judgment, the parties presented conflicting evidence regarding the 
shareholders’ later actions. At least some of the water users acted as though there was a 
corporate entity: they conducted meetings and issued stock, and for a time before the 
reservoir failed around 1911, the entity may have had a role in water distribution, but 
even that is murky. Other evidence demonstrated that Minnie Maud never carried out its 
true purpose: water distribution. Rather, each water user controlled their own diversion 
from the source based on irrigated acres, not company shares. Despite the competing 
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inferences these facts create, the district court ruled as a matter of law that the Deed, the 
first and only attempted conveyance of water rights to Minnie Maud, waived the Share 
Requirement. 
As a matter of law, the Articles defined and conditioned Minnie Maud’s authority, 
including its function. By its plain terms, the Articles instructed the water users to convey 
their water rights to Minnie Maud, which had no power to act, and no function, until the 
Share Requirement was met. Although the State acknowledged receipt of the Articles and 
issued a corporate certificate, nothing in the certificate permitted Minnie Maud to act 
outside the strict, and strictly enforced, confines of its Articles. Thus, while the form of 
the corporation was complete, its operation, function, and its obligations to the 
contracting parties, were not. Those matters depended expressly on the Share 
Requirement.  
With no direct evidence of waiver, the district court inferred that the Deed waived 
the Share Requirement. This was error. The facts demonstrate more than one plausible 
inference. Far from waiving the Share Requirement, the only express inference the Deed 
supports is the intention to start to comply with the Articles and the Share Requirement. 
In fact, Article XV anticipated the Deed. The shareholders gave the Deed knowing full 
well that it and the entity could not be effective until the Share Requirement was met. At 
least since 1911-(ish), the shareholders distributed their own water without any help from 
Minnie Maud, and they disputed Minnie Maud’s existence at every turn: in the 1957 
litigation and in their Objections to the PD. 
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Additionally, the district court’s waiver ruling is inconsistent with the PD. The PD 
divides the Water Rights based on irrigated acres allocated to individual farmers. They, 
not Minnie Maud, controlled water diversions. The PD’s hydrographic survey maps 
identify these irrigated acres based on the individual water users who owned and farmed 
the ground. The water users have distributed the Water Rights based on these irrigated 
acres for over 100 years—at least since Minnie Maud’s reservoir failed. Carlson seeks to 
upend a century of on the ground water use.  
The district court’s ruling permits Carlson to use water he’s never used, and that is 
approved for use on land he’s never owned or irrigated. His claim to own 60% of Minnie 
Maud’s water falls short—the unfulfilled Share Requirement prevented Minnie Maud 
from receiving and holding title to the Water Rights. Accordingly, summary judgment 
based on the Deed alone was error and should be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
 
 Formed to regulate and distribute water to shareholders, mutual irrigation 
companies are a long-standing feature of western water law and distribution. 
See Burtenshaw v. Bountiful Irr. Co., 61 P.2d 312, 315 (Utah 1936)(“A mutual, irrigation 
company, organized to supply water to its stockholders in proportion to the amount of 
their stock, is under the duty of . . . regulating and dividing its [water] among the 
stockholders in accordance with their interests . . . .” (citation omitted)). “Water rights are 
pooled in a mutual company for convenience of operation and more efficient distribution 
. . . .” Genola Town v. Santaquin City, 80 P.2d 930, 936 (Utah 1938). The water users are 
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issued stock, entitling them “to demand [an] aliquot share of the water in proportion as 
[their] stock holding bears to all the stock.” Id.10 
The company owes “a duty to use reasonable care and diligence in maintaining its 
canal and keeping it supplied with water, and of regulating and dividing its use among the 
shareholders in accordance with their interests.” Swasey v. Rocky Point Ditch Co., 617 
P.2d 375, 379 (Utah 1980). These companies must “furnish such a proportion of water to 
each of its shareholders as the member of shares bear to the whole number of shares of 
the stock of the company.” Id. at 378. They “divide water” among shareholders and 
“stand[] as a single appropriator with a duty to protect” shareholder rights. In re Uintah 
Basin, 2006 UT 19, ¶36, 133 P.3d 410 (citation omitted).11 
Such was Minnie Maud’s intended purpose—“constructing, purchasing and 
owning water reservoirs, ditches, and canals, and other means of controlling and 
distributing waters for irrigation and domestic use, and for the purpose of appropriating, 
purchasing, owning and distributing water for [such uses] to the stockholders . . . .” 
(R(2)-802). Shortly after the Articles were signed, certain nascent shareholders purported 
to convey by the Deed “all their and each of their rights and claims of every kind and 
nature whatsoever, in and to the waters of Minnie Maud Creek” to Minnie Maud. (R(2)-
                                                 
10 “[A] mutual water company is a nonprofit corporation that owns diversion or storage 
works and delivers water at cost to users who own its stock, and that derives its operating 
funds from assessments levied against the stockholders.” Frank J. Trelease, Water Law, 
Resource Use and Environmental Protection, Ch. 6 at 612, n. 1. See also 2 S. Wiel, Water 
Rights in the Western States §1266 at 1170-71 (3d ed. 1911); Jacobucci v. District Court, 
541 P.2d 667, 672-73 (Colo. 1975)(general discussion of mutual irrigation companies). 
11 See generally, Wells A. Hutchins, Water Rights Laws in the Nineteen Western States, 
564 (Vol. 1 1972), quoting Genola, 80 P.2d at 936. 
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1279). A reservoir was constructed, but it washed out sometime around 1911-13, and the 
company (if it ever did), never regulated or distributed water after that. (R(2)-843–44, 
988, 1664). Rather, each user controlled its own diversion from the source based on 
irrigated acres, not company shares. (R(2)-843–44, 929–30, 1052–66). 
Rather than waive the Share Requirement, the Deed was the first and apparently 
only attempt to comply with the Articles, resulting in the only shares—2,377—ever 
issued. (R(2)-1279, 1358, 1663). The district court, however, gave the Deed dispositive 
weight, ruling as a matter of law that it, alone, waived the Share Requirement. (R(2)-
1673–74).  
Because waiver is so fact-dependent, the first step is to “inquire whether there are 
disputed material facts.” IHC Health Servs. v. D & K Mgmt., Inc., 2003 UT 5, ¶6, 73 P.3d 
320. If none, this court “considers all undisputed material facts in the light most favorable 
to the nonmoving party before determining whether the trial court's decision on the 
application of the law of waiver to those facts falls within the bounds of its discretion.” 
Id. (citation omitted). On summary judgment, the district court may neither weigh 
credibility nor assign weight to conflicting evidence. Martin v. Lauder, 2010 UT App 
216, ¶14, 239 P.3d 519.  
I. THE DISTRICT COURT RULED INCORRECTLY THAT THE DEED WAIVED 
THE SHARE REQUIREMENT. 
 
A. The articles govern corporate existence and power. 
 
In their attempt to incorporate, Minnie Maud’s nascent shareholders complied 
with the law. They signed code-compliant Articles, accepted and recognized as such by 
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the state. (R(2)-980–81, 1449). The state’s certificate, of course, confirms only that the 
articles “contain the statement of facts required by law, and that said corporation is 
hereby constituted a body corporate . . . .” (R(2)-1449). The state does not, and has no 
authority to, determine whether any conditions are satisfied, the Share Requirement in 
particular, leaving that matter to the contracting parties. 
“[T]he intentions of [contracting] parties are controlling,” and unambiguous intent 
is “determined from the plain meaning of the contractual language, and the contract may 
be interpreted as a matter of law.” Cent. Fla. Invs., Inc. v. Parkwest Assoc., 2002 UT 3, 
¶12, 40 P.3d 599 (citations omitted). See also Mid-America Pipeline Co. v. Four-Four, 
Inc., 2009 UT 43, ¶19, 216 P.3d 352 (if terms are “unambiguous, we look no further than 
the plain meaning of the contractual language.”).12 
Articles of incorporation define and limit corporate authority. Okelberry v. West 
Daniels Land Assoc., 2005 UT App 327, ¶14, 120 P.3d 34 (corporation “may not act in 
any way not authorized in its . . . articles . . . or bylaws”)(citation omitted). This was just 
as true when the effort to form Minnie Maud began. Thompson v. McFarland, 82 P. 478, 
480 (Utah 1905)(corporation has only the power its shareholders give it). The articles are 
“the basis of a contract . . . between the corporation and its stockholders.” Fower v. Provo 
Bench Canal and Irr. Co., 101 P.2d 375, 376 (Utah 1940); see also Salt Lake City v. 
                                                 
12 See also Coulter & Smith, Ltd. v. Russell, 966 P.2d 852, 857 (Utah 1998)(“cardinal rule 
in construing . . . a contract is to give effect to the intentions of the parties.” (alteration 
and omission in original)(internal quotation marks omitted)). The court does not second-
guess the parties; nor does it create an agreement more favorable to either side. Swenson 
v. Erickson, 2000 UT 16, ¶19, 998 P.2d 807 (court does not “second-guess the judgment 
of covenanting parties”).  
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Cahoon & Maxfield Irr. Co. 879 P.2d 248, 252 (Utah 1994)(articles governed stock 
transactions). 
 Shareholders cannot confer power on directors that is not rooted in the articles. 
Seeley v. Huntington Canal & Ag. Ass’n, 75 P. 367 (Utah 1904). The corporation has 
only the powers the articles give it, Park v. Alta Ditch & Canal Co., 458 P.2d 625, 628 
(Utah 1969), limiting the directors to their express terms, Seeley, 75 P. at 367, and those 
“necessarily implied” to achieve corporate purposes. Park, 458 P.2d at 628. Because 
Article XII, §10 of the Utah Constitution limits a corporation to what is “expressly 
authorized in its charter, or articles of incorporation,” a “strict interpretation must be 
given [those] articles . . . .” Zion’s Sav. Bank & Trust Co. v. Tropic & E. Fork Irr. Co. 
126 P.2d 1053, 1054 (Utah 1942). 
The Articles are explicit that Minnie Maud intended to purchase the incorporators’ 
water rights. The Articles state that Minnie Maud’s existence and purpose was  
to construct, purchase, and own, reservoirs, ditches and canals in 
Carbon County, Utah, and to purchase, appropriate and receive and 
own waters and water rights and to distribute to its several 
stockholders waters owned by it, . . . and especially to purchase, 
receive and own the canals, waters, and water rights now owned by 
the several residents and appropriators of water on and along 
Minnie Maud Creek in Nine Mile Canyon, Carbon County, Utah and 
it is intended that this corporation shall succeed to the property rights 
of said residents and appropriators, in the waters and ditches and 
canals of said Minnie Maud Creek.  
 
(Emphasis added) (R(2)-803).  
Article XIV states that Minnie Maud “shall and does hereby purchase, take, 
receive and hold all the water rights now held and claimed by the several incorporators 
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hereto . . . .” (R(2)-805). At the time the Articles were drafted, the incorporators’ water 
rights had already been assessed and valued. Article XV of the Articles states 
that the said water rights and canals now owned by the individual 
appropriators along said creek, who are incorporators hereto, are 
reasonably worth the sum of Two Thousand Three Hundred and 77 
dollars, and said property is conveyed by the respective owners 
thereof to this corporation for 2 thousand 3 hundred and 77 shares of 
stock at the par value thereof, . . . and said 2 thousand 3 hundred and 
77 shares of stock are hereby declared to be fully paid up capital 
stock. 
 
(R(2)-806).  
The very next section, Article XVI, provides the condition precedent, which 
captures the entire agreement: “This corporation shall not be effective for any of the 
purposes mentioned herein until at least 3000 shares of the unpaid portion of the capital 
stock shall have been subscribed.” (Id.). In this context, and by its plain terms, the 
incorporators agreed to convey their water rights to Minnie Maud, but that Minnie Maud 
could not act—had no function—unless and until the Share Requirement, consisting of 
the “unpaid portion of the capital stock” was satisfied. (Id.). It never was. 
B. Minnie Maud’s existence was conditioned on an unambiguous and 
never-satisfied condition precedent. 
 
Conditions precedent are operative facts “on which the existence of some 
particular legal relation depends.” Utah Golf Ass’n. v. North Salt Lake, 2003 UT 38, ¶13, 
79 P.3d 919 (citation omitted). Because “[t]he relationship between a voluntary 
association and its members is . . . contractual,” Turner v. Hi-Country Homeowners 
Ass’n., 910 P.2d 1223, 1225 (Utah 1996)(citation omitted), it follows that a condition 
precedent is equally strictly enforced. Terms are considered “in relation to all of the 
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others, with a view toward giving effect to all and ignoring none.” Café Rio, Inc. v. 
Larkin-Gifford-Overton, LLC, 2009 UT 27, ¶25, 207 P.3d 1235 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
Innerlight, Inc. v. Matrix Group, LLC, is functionally on point. 2009 UT 31, 214 
P.3d 854. There, a distributorship agreement contained choice of law and forum selection 
clauses and, in a separate section, an express condition precedent. Id. ¶5. Specifically, the 
agreement required that any litigation be brought in Florida, using that state’s substantive 
law. Id. ¶3. The agreement also provided that Innerlight, the distributor, would enjoy 
exclusive distribution rights in the agreed territory, conditioned on “[Innerlight's] written 
acceptance of [Matrix's] Product Price List . . . .” Id. ¶15. Innerlight later sued, claiming 
that the entire agreement was unenforceable because Matrix never satisfied the condition 
precedent, having never providing the Price List. Id. 
Reversing summary judgment, and relying on the agreement’s unambiguous 
terms, our Supreme Court explained that the forum selection clause was not subject to the 
condition precedent (the Price List).13 Id. ¶17. Rather, only the exclusive distributorship 
term was its subject. Id. What the district court got wrong in Innerlight is the inverse of 
the error here. Innerlight’s condition applied to a single term of the agreement—the 
exclusive distributorship term—and the trial court there erred in applying it to the entire 
agreement. Id. ¶15.  
                                                 
13 Specifically, the opinion explains that “the district court's denial of Matrix's motion to 
dismiss for improper venue was a necessary predicate to its grant of summary judgment 
in favor of Innerlight. In its summary judgment order, the district court specified that “the 
venue terms ... under the [Contract] are not enforceable because the [Contract] is an 
ineffective executory contract.” Innerlight, 2009 UT 31, ¶9.  
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Here, Minnie Maud’s very existence and power to function, the entire voluntary 
association, and all of the Articles’ terms, were expressly conditioned on the Share 
Requirement. (R(2)-806). Minnie Maud was not “effective for any purposes mentioned,” 
which included water right ownership and water distribution, short of that requirement. 
(R(2)-805–06).14 The Share Requirement is unambiguous, and everyone agrees it was 
never satisfied. Only 2,377 shares issued. (R(2)-802, 806, 1358, 1662–63, 1671).  
C. The Deed was inoperative because Minnie Maud was not “effective” 
for any purpose. 
 
As a matter of law, entities that do not exist, that have no power to function, 
cannot own anything. Sharp v. Riekhof, 747 P.2d 1044, 1046 (Utah 1987)(attempted 
conveyances of property interests to nonexisting entities are void). “[A] deed of 
conveyance is void unless the grantee named is capable of taking and holding the 
property named in the deed.” Id. (citation omitted). There could not be an effective 
conveyance to Minnie Maud, or an award of water rights under the PD for that matter, 
unless and until the condition precedent was satisfied.  
The incorporators attempted to convey to an entity that according to their own 
agreement did not yet exist and could not function for that, or any, purpose. “Such 
attempted conveyances are void.” Young v. Young, 1999 UT 38, ¶22, 979 P.2d 338 
                                                 
14 See Oxford American Dictionary 249 (1999)(defining “effective” as “1. having a 
definite or desired effect. . . . 3. a. actual; existing in fact rather than officially or 
theoretically. b. actually usable; realizable; equivalent in its effect . . . 4. coming into 
operation”); see also Black’s Dictionary 628 (10th ed. 2014)(defining “effective” as “1. 
(Of a statute, order, contract, etc.) in operating at a given time <effective June 1>. A . . . 
contract is often said to be effective beginning (and perhaps ending) at a designated time. 
. . . 3. Productive; achieving a result”). 
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(citation omitted), overruled in part on other grounds by USA Power, LLC v. PacifiCorp, 
2016 UT 20, ¶107, 372 P.3d 629; Julian v. Petersen, 966 P.2d 878, 881 (Utah App. 
1998)(“It is well-settled that an attempted conveyance of land to a nonexisting entity is 
void.”). A void act is beyond rescue by ratification or acceptance.  Ockey v. Lehmer, 2008 
UT 37, ¶18, 189 P.3d 51(explaining void versus voidable: “A contract or a deed that is 
void cannot be ratified or accepted, and anyone can attack its validity in court.”).  
The Deed embodying the attempted conveyance to Minnie Maud was not merely 
voidable. It was void, meaning that it had “no legal effect and was never valid.” A legal 
nullity.  M.F. v. J.F., 2013 UT App 247, ¶15, 312 P.3d 946, citing Black’s Law 
Dictionary 1709 (9th ed. 2009)(defining “void” as “[o]f no legal effect” and noting that 
“void can be properly applied only to those provisions that are of no effect whatsoever”).  
Minnie Maud was to acquire its shareholders’ water rights. (R(2)-805–06). That 
provision, essential to formation, was just as subject to the Share Requirement as the rest 
of the Articles, i.e., corporate function itself. One of Minnie Maud’s “purposes” was to 
“succeed to the property rights of said residents and appropriators, in the waters and 
ditches and canals of . . . Minnie Maud Creek,” but only if the Share Requirement was 
met. (R(2)-803). Immediate acquisition of the water rights was an express purpose: 
Minnie Maud “does hereby purchase, take, receive and hold all the water rights now held 
and claimed by the several incorporators . . . together with all canals, dams, [and other 
infrastructure] used therewith throughout the whole system . . . ,” but only after a 
satisfied Share Requirement. (R(2)-805).  
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 Minnie Maud did not function for any purpose—including its stated purposes of 
acquiring water rights and distributing water—unless it reached the Share Requirement. 
(R(2)-806). The Deed, dated just six weeks after the Articles, could not operate to convey 
anything because the purported grantee had no function—no power—as a matter of 
substantive contract rights among the very parties attempting the conveyance: “This 
corporation shall not be effective for any of the purposes mentioned herein until at least 
3000 shares of the unpaid portion of the capital stock shall have been subscribed.”)). See, 
e.g., W.L. Wells Co. v. Gastonia Cotton Mfg. Co., 198 U.S. 177, 186 (1905)(“[I]f the 
charter of the company had made it a condition precedent to its becoming a corporation 
that a certain amount of capital stock should be subscribed and paid for, a compliance 
with that condition would have been necessary before the company would have become a 
corporation entitled to sue and be sued in the courts of the United States.”). 
Corporate existence—the form of the entity—was indeed acknowledged when the 
corporate certificate was issued, but only because the Articles said all the right things. 
(R(2)-1449 (“[S]aid articles contain the statement of facts required by law[.]”). Nothing 
in the certificate, however, attempted to construe, and it certainly could not waive, the 
Share Requirement, which no party contends was satisfied. 
D. The Deed did not waive the Share Requirement.  
 
The district court ruled that the Deed, alone, waived the Share Requirement. 
Waiver is the “intentional relinquishment of a known right.” Soter’s, Inc. v. Deseret Fed., 
etc., 857 P.2d 935, 937 (Utah 1993). There must be an “existing right,” “knowledge” of 
it, and “intent” to give it up. Id. Waiver must be distinct, either express or implied. Id. “A 
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fact finder need only determine whether the totality of the circumstances warrants the 
inference of relinquishment.” Id. at 941 (citation omitted). 
Soter’s explains: 
Because the essence of waiver is relinquishment, the statement in 
Phoenix indicated that the intentional relinquishment of a right must 
be distinctly made. With this legal requirement, we ensured that 
waiver would not be found from any particular set of facts unless it 
was clearly intended . . . . although the necessary intent may be clear 
or distinct when there is an express waiver, such intent may be more 
difficult to prove when waiver is to be implied from conduct or 
silence. Consistent with this point is the general principle in our case 
law that “[m]ere silence is not a waiver unless there is some duty or 
obligation to speak.” 
 
Id. at 940 (citation omitted), citing Phoenix, Inc. v. Heath, 61 P.2d 308 (Utah 1936). 
The Share Requirement is an unambiguous and existential express condition 
precedent controlling the entire venture. The Deed says nothing about waiver and does 
not mention the Share Requirement. (R(2)-1279). Rather, the Deed is an overt act 
consistent with the undisputed attempt to incorporate, coming as it did just six weeks 
after the Articles were signed, and it is consistent with the express purpose of 
incorporation—shareholder water distribution. (R(2)-802–06, 1279).  
In other words, no one disputes that the parties intended and tried to form a 
corporation, and for purposes of the then-Utah Code, they did, which is to say that, as far 
as the State of Utah was concerned, the Articles were code-compliant. (R(2)-1449, 1471–
72). The form of the corporation was complete, but its substantive operation, its 
prospective function, its power, and the obligations of the contracting parties, were not. 
Those matters depended expressly on the Share Requirement.  
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Summary judgment, of course, involves no fact finding. Rather, the undisputed 
facts must satisfy the elements of waiver, if not directly, then by inference. Because the 
Deed did not expressly waive anything, the district court had to infer waiver.  
An inference is “the act of passing from one judgment to another, or from a belief 
or cognition to a judgment.” State v. Simmons, 759 P.2d 1152, 1158 n.11 (Utah 1988). It 
is a “conclusion; a deduction” culled from established fact. Id. To “infer” is to “accept or 
derive as a consequence, conclusion, or probability . . . .” Id.; see also State v. Hester, 
2000 UT App 159, ¶16, 3 P.3d 725 (“While it is sometimes subtle, there is in fact a 
difference between drawing a reasonable inference and merely speculating about 
possibilities.”), cert denied, 9 P.3d 170 (Utah 2000); id. (defining “inference” and 
“speculation”).15 See USA Power, LLC v. PacifiCorp, 2010 UT 31, ¶65, 235 P.3d 749 
(“inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence . . . may create a genuine issue of 
material fact”).16 
Even when the “objective facts are undisputed [that] does not mean that no 
genuine issues remain as to those facts.” Id. ¶33. Thus, “[a] district court is precluded 
                                                 
15 “An inference is a conclusion reached by considering other facts and deducing a logical 
consequence from them. . . . [A] deduction as to the existence of a fact which human 
experience teaches us can reasonably and logically be drawn from proof of other facts. 
[While], speculation is . . . the act or practice of theorizing about matters over which there 
is no certain knowledge.” Hester, 2000 UT App 159, ¶16 (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
16 By definition, inferences must be reasonable, reached “by the process of logic and 
reason, based upon common experience . . . .” Wyatt v. Baughman, 239 P.2d 193, 198-99 
(Utah 1951). An inference must be rooted in “basic facts which remain in the case” Id. at 
199. See also Black’s Law Dictionary 710 (10th ed. 2014)(“Inferential fact. A fact 
established by conclusions drawn from other evidence rather than from direct testimony 
or evidence; a fact derived logically from other facts.”) 
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from granting summary judgment 'if the facts shown by the evidence . . . support more 
than one plausible but conflicting inference on a pivotal issue in the case . . . particularly . 
. . if the inferences depend upon subjective feelings or intent.’” Uintah Basin Med. Ctr., 
2008 UT 15, ¶19 (first omission in original)(citation omitted). A “dispute” about 
“understanding, intention, and consequences of” established facts “may defeat summary 
judgment.” USA Power, 2010 UT 31, ¶32 (citation omitted).  
Here, the district court ruled as a matter of law that the Deed was dispositive, 
overlooking other plausible, conflicting inferences. The facts invoked by the district 
court, however, form a mere tautology. That the contracting parties went about the 
business of doing what they agreed to do—start a company, build a dam, issue shares, 
elect directors and appoint officers, and even a water master (R(2)-802–07, 843–44, 909, 
988, 1456), and early in the process conveying their water rights, (R(2)-1279), all of 
which is undisputed—does not indicate a waiver of anything. These are the acts of 
incorporating, not the acts of waiving the terms and conditions of the express agreement 
to incorporate. 
The Share Requirement identifies an express right, which is to say that it preserved 
the parties’ right not to associate unless and until their fixed conditions were satisfied. 
Waiver of that express right requires more than an early, isolated instance of non-
enforcement, particularly where the transfer of water rights was expressly contemplated 
in the same Articles and occurred essentially contemporaneously with the Articles, just 
six weeks later. (R(2)-802–07, 1279).  
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Far from waiving the Share Requirement, the only express inference the Deed 
supports is the intent to start to comply with the Articles and the Share Requirement. The 
Deed reflects the first and apparently only conveyance of property to the corporation. The 
Articles required water right conveyance. (R(2)-805–06). Article XV itself specifically 
contemplated the incorporator’s conveyance of their water rights in exchange for 2,377 
shares. (Id.) This conveyance was so expected that the Articles themselves state that these 
2,377 shares were “hereby declared to be fully paid up capital stock,” even though the 
Articles preceded the Deed by six weeks. (Id.). 
Until now, the parties and the district court have assumed that the Share 
Requirement would be met if 3000 total shares were subscribed. But a closer reading 
suggests otherwise. Though they had yet to be conveyed, Article XV states that the 2,377 
shares were declared “to be fully paid up capital stock.” (R(2)-806). The Share 
Requirement, in Article XVI, comes next. The Articles are clear: although these 2,377 
shares had been “fully paid up,” “the corporation shall not be effective until at least 3000 
shares of the unpaid portion of the capital stock” are issued. (Id.)(emphasis added). Thus, 
it is reasonable to infer that the parties intended that 5,377 shares were necessary for the 
corporation to exist—indeed, requiring two-thirds of the capital stock to be issued before 
the corporation could function. (R(2)-803 (“The amount of the capital stock of this 
corporation shall be Eight Thousand Dollars divided into Eight Thousand shares . . . .”)). 
Whichever total the parties intended—3,000 or 5,377 shares—it is undisputed that the 
Share Requirement was not met. 
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That the shareholders never waived the Share Requirement is an equally plausible 
inference to be drawn from the evidence, which only begins with the Deed. Later events, 
starting after the reservoir failure, which seems to have been the last straw for Minnie 
Maud because it did not distribute water (its primary purpose) after that, suggest that 
water users abandoned the corporate venture. Their successors certainly saw things that 
way. They litigated that issue to a standstill, (R(2)-928–35, 1317–22, 1407–15), and 
emphasized the point with the Objections. (R(2)-1052–66). 
The water users disputed Minnie Maud’s existence at every turn where that issue 
was pressed: the 1957 litigation (R(2)-928–35, 1317–22) and in the Objections. (R(2)-
1052–66). At best, those who did attempt to convey their rights endeavored to move 
forward as a corporate entity. They held meetings, issued shares, and elected 
management. (R(2)-802–07, 843–44, 909, 988, 1456).  But that group could not waive 
the Share Requirement for all other Minnie Maud Creek water users. Other users diverted 
and managed their own water on their own land. (R(2)-843–44, 929–30, 1052–66). 
 Thus the danger of invoking the Deed alone to show waiver. This is, after all, 
summary judgment. “Because waiver is intensely fact-dependent, district courts should 
exercise care when granting summary judgment on this issue.” IHC Health Servs., 2008 
UT 36, ¶15. “Under this legal standard, a fact finder need only determine whether the 
totality of the circumstances ‘warrants the inference of relinquishment.’” Soter’s, 857 
P.2d at 941 (citation omitted). These “circumstances” are the fact pool from which 
inferences are drawn. “The word ‘genuine’ indicates that a district court is not required to 
draw every possible inference of fact, no matter how remote or improbable, in favor of 
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the nonmoving party. Instead, it is required to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of 
the nonmoving party.” IHC Health Servs. v. D & K Mgmt., Inc., 2008 UT 36, ¶19, --- 
P.3d ---.  
Genuine fact issues mean that “reasonable minds could differ” on a given 
“material issue.” Ron Shepherd Ins., Inc. v. Shields, 882 P.2d 650, 655 (Utah 1994) 
(citation omitted). For example, in Ellsworth Paulsen Constr. v. 51-Spr, LLC, 2006 UT 
App 353, 144 P.3d 261, aff’d., 2008 UT 28, this court found error after the district court 
inferred on summary judgment on a material issue—whether parties were obligated to 
share losses as part of a joint venture. Id. ¶¶14, 18. Affidavit testimony raised a different 
but plausible interpretation of the agreement. Id. ¶17. Summary judgment was not 
available because “there [we]re other equally plausible inferences to be drawn from the 
evidence.” Id. ¶18.  
Here, because the Deed is consistent with the purpose of incorporating in the first 
place (R(2)-802–06, 1279), it cannot serve, at least not by itself, as a waiver of a 
condition precedent to corporate function. It cannot be as a matter of law, in other words, 
that an attempt to comply with the Articles, specifically Article XV, constitutes a waiver 
of the explicit condition contained in Article XVI and that captures the entire 
incorporation effort. The Deed is just one of an array of circumstantial evidence from 
which the district court could, and on remand must, draw inferences. 
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II. THE DISTRICT COURT’S LEGAL CONCLUSION OF WAIVER IS 
INCONSISTENT WITH THE GENERAL DETERMINATION AND THE PD. 
 
  Since 1919, water rights in a given source or drainage are determined en masse. 
Utah Code §73-4-1, et seq. A general determination “confer[s] legitimacy on those 
claiming lawful ownership based on beneficial use of the public waters of Utah under our 
state’s doctrine of prior appropriation.” Penta Creeks, LLC v. Olds, 2008 UT 25, ¶7, 182 
P.3d 362, citing Utah Code §73-4-3. “The purpose of the general adjudication process is 
to prevent piecemeal litigation regarding water rights and to provide a permanent record 
of all such rights by decree.” Jensen v. Morgan, 844 P.2d 287, 289 (Utah 1992). 
Since 1903, the state engineer and the district courts evaluate water right claims to, 
among other things, determine beneficial use. A general determination (sometimes called 
a general adjudication) of water rights tests approved rights against actual beneficial use. 
“In all such cases the court shall proceed to determine the water rights involved in the 
manner provided by [Title 73, chapter 4].” §73-4-3(6). 
Once commenced, water users on the system submit to the state engineer any 
claims in the defined area, §73-4-5, and failure to do so is a permanent bar. §73-4-9. The 
state engineer conducts a hydrographic survey of the system and the irrigated acres and 
evaluates the claims. §73-4-3(3)(a). See also In re Escalante Drainage Area, 355 P.2d 64, 
65 n.2 (Utah 1960)(“A hydrographic survey is a very extensive survey made by qualified 
engineers.”). Specifically, the state engineer “survey[s] the water source and the ditches, 
canals, wells, tunnels, [and] other works diverting water from the water source.” §73-4-
3(3)(a). The survey depicts actual use, not what a user claims or what a certificate or 
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prior decree says. See, generally, Green River Canal Co. v. Thayn, 2003 UT 50, ¶29-32, 
84 P.3d 1134 (general determination process). 
The state engineer then prepares a PD of rights for the area. §73-4-11. The PD is a 
“recommendation” to the court, Crockett & Walsh Dev. Corp. v. Pinecrest Pipeline Op. 
Co., 2004 UT 67, ¶41, 98 P.3d 1, which is the final arbiter of the water rights. American 
Fork Irr. Co. v. Linke, 239 P.2d 188, 191 (Utah 1951). A party disputing the PD objects, 
and the court decides the issue. Following a protest period, “or if all objections have been 
resolved, the district court must enter judgment rendering the [PD] the final adjudication 
of water rights for the given area.” Green River Canal Co. v. Olds, 2004 UT 106, ¶7, 110 
P.3d 666, citing §73-4-12. Failure to protest a PD bars further challenge. Butler, Crockett 
& Walsh Dev. Corp. v. Pinecrest Pipeline Operating Co., 2004 UT  
67, ¶22, 98 P.3d 1. Until modified by the court and unless a prior decree governs, the 
state engineer distributes the water according to the PD, either as submitted or as 
modified, until a decree is entered. §73-4-11(3). 
 A general determination, then, resolves the inevitable disputes and uncertainties 
that brew over time in a given drainage among water users and determines the extent of 
existing rights. See Jensen, 844 P.2d at 289. Water use changes, points of diversion are 
moved, and land goes in and out of irrigation and other uses. See §73-3-3 and -8 
(application process for changing water use).  
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A. The PD divides water based on irrigated acres belonging to specific 
farmers. 
 
 Water users with claims in a general determination must identify the particulars of 
their use. They must identify flow rate, the nature of use, and if they claim a storage right 
“the quantity of water stored in acre-feet,” and the time of year of use and “such other 
facts as will clearly define the extent and nature of the appropriation claimed . . . .” Utah 
Code §73-4-5(1). If the use is for irrigation, the claimant must show “the area of land 
irrigated” and other indices of irrigation use. Id. §73-4-6.17 Precision matters. Hardy v. 
Beaver Cnty. Irr. Co., 234 P. 524, 526 (Utah 1924)(“While the respondents allege in their 
pleadings that it was also their custom to use the water which flowed in the river during 
the winter for irrigation purposes, the evidence fails to show, with any degree of 
certainty, that there was any general use of the water in that manner.”); State Engineer v. 
Shepherd, 2005 UT App 450, ¶9, 128 P.3d 6 (although the parties asserted that they used 
the water for their livestock, pasture, and orchard, they did not “clearly define” the place, 
manner, or extent of such use)).  
Although Minnie Maud appears to have operated a reservoir until around 1911-13 
(R(2)-843–44, 1664), no reservoir storage right appears in the PD, a glaring but telling 
fact about whether or to what extent Minnie Maud had any function. (R(2)-1018–32). 
Rather, the PD identifies specific irrigated acres where the water may be used (and has 
always been used) on property not owned by Minnie Maud, but owned by the individual 
                                                 
17 Since at least 1919, beneficial use for irrigation has been measured by irrigated acres. 
See Ch. 67, §42 Laws of Utah (1919)(“If the proposed use is for irrigation, the [water 
right] application shall show . . . the total acreage . . . and the character of the soil.”)(now 
codified at Utah Code §73-3-2(2)(a)). 
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irrigators. (R(2)-1586–96; see also Addendum 718). The PD says nothing about company 
shares and never purports to define Minnie Maud’s service area. (Id.) This is important. 
Irrigation companies are a “single appropriator” that distributes water to shareholders. 
Those shareholders, however, may take their water at any point along the company 
source or within that area. Indeed, the company may be required to get the water to the 
shareholder. Syrett v. Tropic & E. Fork Irr. Co., 125 P.2d 955, 957 (Utah 1942)(Unless 
otherwise specified, “a stockholder should be entitled to receive his proportionate amount 
of water at any reasonable point along the canal system.”).  
 The hydrographic survey maps here conflict with the PD.  They are consistent 
regarding acres allocated to each water right. The inconsistency is that the PD identifies 
Minnie Maud, while the map shows property owners. The PD correctly identifies 
irrigated acres and the water users who owned and farmed that ground. (Addendum 7; 
R(2)- 1586–96). But the PD then identifies Minnie Maud as the water right owner rather 
than the farmers who diverted and used the water. (R(2)-1018–32). The water rights are 
identified individually, based on precise acreage amounts, and the maps identify property 
owners. (R(2)-1018–32, 1586–96; Addendum 7). We know that at least since the 
beginning of the nineteen-teens that Minnie Maud did not distribute or otherwise control 
                                                 
18 On November 4, 2016, this court granted appellant’s motion to supplement the record, 
and directed the district court to “prepare and transmit to this court a supplemental record 
consisting of the materials provided to the court by both parties at the time of the hearing 
on the parties’ summary judgment motions.” (Order at 2). Addendum 7 contains the 
documents appellant provided to the district court at the summary judgment hearing, as 
well as the relevant portions of the transcript explaining these documents. 
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the water. Rather, the individual irrigators diverted from the stream directly to their 
respective properties. (R(2)-843–44, 929–30, 1052–66).19 
B. Water use and allocation depended on irrigated acres, not Minnie 
Maud shares. 
 
The crux of the dispute concerns rights to water, how it is used and where it is 
(and has been) used. That is, believing that his rights depend on Minnie Maud shares, 
Carlson seeks a result at war with the PD’s mapping of, and recommendation for, actual 
water use. He explains it very clearly: 
[W]ould you please amend the Division’s records to show Michael 
M. Carlson as the owner of 60.12% of water right Nos. 90-24, 90-
184, 90-185, 90-186, 90-187, 90-188, 90-189, 90-190, 90-191, 90-
196, 90-197, and 90-299. 
 
(R(2)-960). 
 
If the summary judgment stands, Carlson will be authorized to use water he’s 
never used on land he’s never owned or irrigated. The water rights he calls out, and of 
which he claims 60%, have been used by others and their successors on their own land 
for more than a century. (Compare R(2)-1586–93 and Addendum 7, with R(2)-957–60). 
Anderson states that, while unsure of the basis for Minnie Maud share distribution, 
shares were distributed based on irrigated acres. (R(2)-843–44). Even this speculation 
                                                 
19 Although statutory, general determinations are a species of quiet title, where water 
rights are confirmed based on actual, beneficial use. Butler, 2004 UT 67, ¶¶24, 30. 
Minnie Maud was long an abandoned effort by the time the PD issued in 1964. It is not 
clear why the PD identifies Minnie Maud as the water right owner. Because the unmet 
Share Requirement was the mandatory condition precedent to its very existence, 
however, Minnie Maud could not acquire anything by virtue of the PD. That water right 
ownership designation was just as void as the Deed. Sharp, 747 P.2d at 1046 (attempted 
property conveyance to nonexisting entities is void).  
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does not square with the PD. The PD recommended that water rights 90-197, 90-299, 90-
186, 90-187, 90-188, 90-189, 90-190, 90-191, 90-24, 90-196, 90-184, and 90-185 be in 
the name of Minnie Maud. (R(2)-1018–32). The PD also assigned each of these rights to 
specific ground, owned by individual irrigators, where the water was used, identifying 
specific acreages. (R(2)-1586–96; Addendum 7).  
The hydrographic survey maps identify which water rights may be used on which 
acres: 
Water Rights Acreage 
90-197, 90-299 148.29 acres 
90-186, 90-187 11 acres 
90-188, 90-189 67.6 acres 
90-190, 90-191 26 acres 
90-24, 90-196 51.1 acres 
90-184, 90-185 98.53 acres 
 Total acres: 402.52 
 
(Id.) 
 Only the 148.29 acres assigned to water rights 90-197 and 90-299 are 
encompassed in the land that Carlson and his predecessor own(ed). (Id.; R(2)-1598–
1617). And only the 51.1 acres assigned to water rights 90-24 and 90-196 is encompassed 
within the land owned by EnerVest and its predecessor. (R(2)-1586–96; Addendum 7). 
The lands do not overlap. Carlson does not own and has never owned any of the acreage 
associated with any of the water rights except those two—90-197 and 90-299. (R(2)-
1598–1617). Therefore, the land Carlson owns includes 148.29 acres of the total 402.52 
acres assigned to Minnie Maude in the PD. This represents just 36.84% of the irrigated 
acres of all the water rights assigned to Minnie Maud. 
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Carlson has never claimed to own more than 1,429 of the 2,377 issued shares. 
(R(2)-959–60). Therefore, Carlson owned, at least theoretically, 60.11% of the total 
possible shares. Neither Carlson nor his predecessors have ever owned 60.11% of the 
irrigated acres to which the PD assigns the water rights. This is the essence of the conflict 
that persists if the PD’s designation that Minnie Maude owns the water rights is allowed 
to stand. 
Here, however, the PD assigns each of the water rights in the name of Minnie 
Maud to very specific properties on which the water has been and may be used. The 
authorized place of use is one of the critical elements of any water right. See, e.g., Utah 
Code §73-3-17(“The certificate issued under this section is prima facie evidence of the 
owner's right to use the water in the quantity, for the purpose, at the place, and during the 
time specified therein, subject to prior rights.”); Ruth B. Hardy Revocable Trust v. Eagle 
Mountain City, 2012 UT App 352, 295 P.3d 188.20 
The hydrographic survey maps, which are part of the PD, identify these specific 
authorized places of use and their owners, none of which are Minnie Maud. (R(2)-1586–
96; Addendum 7). The PD’s water right allocation is based on irrigated acres owned by 
the individual users, which has nothing to do with Minnie Maud shares. (R(2)-844, 1586–
93; Addendum 7). 
 Thus, although Minnie Maud is identified as the water right owner, the PD’s 
allocation of the water itself was based on irrigated acres belonging to and irrigated 
                                                 
20 Utah Div. of Water Rights, Water Right Information, available at http://www.water 
rights.utah.gov/wrinfo/ (last revised July 19, 2011). 
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exclusively by the individual users, not any actual or purported corporate shares. The 
rights are acreage-based, limited, as always and everywhere, by beneficial use.  Utah 
Code §73-1-3 (“Beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure and the limit of all rights to 
the use of water in [Utah]”). This is consistent with the practice at the time that the water 
was distributed based on property ownership—irrigated acres—not share ownership. 
(R(2)-844, 1586–93; Addendum 7).21  Carlson has never used, beneficially or otherwise, 
any of the water identified in the PD on the land he’s never owned. 
 The parties to the 1957 litigation stipulated in August of that year that the water 
would be distributed according to the following specified irrigated acre amounts:  
 Louis Motte, 27 acres;  
 Amber Keel, 50 acres;  
 T. F. Housekeeper, 65 acres;  
 Christensens, 74 acres; 
 Ernest Davis, 120 acres.  
(R(2)-1407–09).  
 Tellingly, the acres total 336, of which Ernest Davis is allocated 120, or 35.7%. 
This is very close to the 36.84% of the irrigated acres assigned to Carlson’s property in 
the PD. (Addendum 7; R(2)-1586–96). 
It is these facts from which the compelling inferences are drawn: Despite the 
attempt to incorporate, the condition precedent was not met, the water users (who would 
                                                 
21 Amber Keel’s Answer in the 1957 litigation states “that for more than 70 years” the 
water was diverted “as they now divert and use said waters.” (R(2)-929). 
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have been shareholders) allocated and used water according to irrigation on their own 
ground, at least after the dam failed. That’s what Anderson states (R(2)-843–44), what 
the answers in the 1957 litigation (R(2)-828–33, 928–35) and the Objections (R(2)-1052–
66) assert, what they stipulated to when staying the 1950’s litigation (R(2)-1407–15), and 
it is how the PD allocated actual water use. (Addendum 7; R(2)-1586–1617). 
Taken to its logical conclusion, Carlson’s theory that water should be allocated 
according to shares gives him water that has always been, and may only be, used on 
property he neither owns nor claims to own and on which he has no right to irrigate. 
(R(2)-956–60 (explaining that Carlson’s right is based on share ownership, not an interest 
in the irrigated acres corresponding to the discreet water rights); R(2)-1598 – 1617 
(showing Carlson’s chain of title, which does not include any land associated with the 
authorized place of use for the EnerVest water rights); R(2)-1586–93 (showing that 
Carlson’s predecessor in interest, Glen Allred, owned properties associated with water 
rights 90-197 and 90-299, that did not overlap with the EnerVest properties associated 
with water rights 90-24 and 90-196); see also Addendum 7).  
He would acquire here more water than he could have ever had as a Minnie Maud 
shareholder. 
C. Short of the Share Requirement, Minnie Maud had no legal ability to 
acquire or own the Water Rights identified in the PD. 
 
Although statutory, general determinations are a species of quiet title, where water 
rights are confirmed based on actual, beneficial use. In re Bear River Drainage Area, 271 
P.2d 846, 848 (Utah 1954)(“[W]ater rights are property rights and a general 
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determination is in essence an action to quiet title to property rights.”). Minnie Maud was 
long an abandoned effort by the time the PD issued in 1964. (R(2)-828–33, 928–35). It is 
not clear why the PD identifies Minnie Maud as the water right owner. Because the 
unmet Share Requirement was the mandatory condition precedent to any function or 
purpose it could have had, however, Minnie Maud could not acquire anything by virtue 
of the PD. The PD’s water right ownership designation was just as void as the Deed. See 
Sharp, 747 P.2d at 1046. 
The foregoing discussion—the purposes of Minnie Maud and the general 
determination—sets the boundaries of available inferences—the “totality of the 
circumstances”—to explain the parties’ conduct. This Court and our Supreme Court 
explain these matters (general determinations and mutual irrigation companies) with a 
century of consistent gloss. When these larger principles are added, the compelling 
inference is clear: A handful of farmers joined forces to better their irrigation fortunes. 
For reasons we may never know, they expressly conditioned their relationship, leaving 
nothing to chance, owing each other nothing if the condition is not met. “Until” it is, 
Minnie Maud had no function and no power.  
A corporation exists only on the terms to which its owners agree. The district 
court’s focus on the Deed, an early event considering that Minnie Maud’s existence was 
squarely at issue in 1957, (R(2)-921–35, 1583–84), at the expense of events before and 
since the 1957 Action, is not just drawing inferences; it is weighing them. That is, other 
facts and entirely reasonable inferences were presented and argued (see, e.g., R(2)-1398 – 
1400, 1403, 1623), but the district court seized on one, giving it dispositive weight. That 
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was the error, the selection of one above other just as reasonable inferences that 
discovery and a full trial would cull.  
Something spurred Davis into action in 1957, when he alleged that others were 
using his water, followed by a claim that Minnie Maud was a going concern despite an 
existential disagreement with those Davis claimed were its owners, (R(2)-921–26), an 
unusual litigation posture, to be sure. Perhaps it was two things about to converge: he 
owned the bulk of the Minnie Maud shares, and a PD was in the works (Id.; R(2)-1411–
14). If he could get Minnie Maud identified as the water right owner, he controls a lot of 
water on land he’s never owned or farmed. (Addendum 7; R(2)- 1586–96, 1598–1617). 
This is a fact because that is exactly what Carlson gets if he prevails. (R(2)-2156). 
Perhaps Davis (he had motive and opportunity) gave a copy of the Deed, or the corporate 
certificate, to the state engineer, who then understandably relied on it in the PD.  
Either way, those who litigated Davis to a standstill to await the PD then promptly 
objected to the part where it says what Davis (and Carlson) needed it to say. (R(2)-1052–
66). The next question is, why they did not immediately pursue the Objections. One 
answer is, they were not highly motivated. Minnie Maud was already irrelevant to them. 
As they saw it, they diverted and controlled their own water on their own land for many 
years, (R(2)-843–44, 929–30, 1052–66), just like the PD describes. (R(2)-1586–96; 
Addendum 7). They were beneficially using the water without Minnie Maud while their 
Objections preserved the issue. Utah Code §73-4-11(2). They continued using their water 
as they always had, (R(2)-843–44, 929–30, 988, 1052–66), so pursuing the Objections 
was understandably not a priority. General determinations are not rocket docket cases. 
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Time was on their side because every day they diverted, controlled and used the water 
without Minnie Maud involvement was further evidence that the water was theirs and 
that there was no Minnie Maud. 
These circumstances raise at least one equally important question: Why weren’t 
the water rights conveyed back if Minnie Maud never functioned pursuant to the 
Articles? One answer is that they did not have to be. These parties, who were very 
specific about the terms of their voluntary association, are deemed to know and 
incorporate the law governing the subject matter of their transaction. Hall v. Warren, 632 
P.2d 848, 850 (Utah 1981).22 Without 3,000 shares from the “unpaid portion,” there is no 
Minnie Maud capable of functioning, including owning property, according to the only 
agreement—the Articles—capable of establishing corporate power. With no functioning 
Minnie Maud, the Deed lacks a grantee “capable of holding title.” See Kelly v. Hard 
Money Funding, Inc., 2004 UT App 44, ¶23 n.5, 87 P.3d 734. 
Conveyances to entities that do not exist are void. That knowledge, imputed under 
the law, explains why there is (apparently) no return deed.  An entity that cannot own 
property also cannot convey it.  It was not required as a matter of law. That is how 
                                                 
22 “Contracting parties are presumed to contract in reference to the existing law; indeed, 
they are presumed to have in mind all the existing laws relating to the contact, or to the 
subject matter thereof. Thus, it is commonly said that all existing applicable or relevant 
and valid statutes, ordinances, regulations, and settled law of the land at the time a 
contract is made become a part of it and must be read into it just as if an express 
provision to the effect were inserted therein, except where the contract discloses a 
contrary intention . . . .” Hall, 632 P.2d at 850 (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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inferences should be drawn when summary judgment is on the line. The analysis, and 
resulting legal theory, must account for all of the circumstances.   
CONCLUSION 
 Isolating, as the district court did, one link in a lengthy chain of events, many with 
legal significance (such as the PD’s designation of irrigated acres owned by individual 
users), and bestowing on it dispositive meaning, sacrifices substance to form. When 
waiver is the issue, a single act is rarely dispositive. Rather, “the totality of the 
circumstances [must] warrant[] the inference of relinquishment.” Soter’s, 857 P.2d at 
942.  
 Here, they do not. Minnie Maud may have distributed water until the dam failed, 
but even that period of time can be explained. The incorporators were still (presumably) 
working to reach the critical mass of shareholders on which corporate function depended. 
Subsequent events, however, in light of the never-satisfied Share Requirement, tell the 
real story. The irrigators diverted their water and irrigated their land, exactly as the PD 
depicts. Summary judgment based on the Deed alone was error and should be reversed.   
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Addendum 1 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
In the matter of the General Determination of 
all the Rights, Both Surface and 
Underground, within the Drainage Area of the 
Uintah Basin. 
NINE MILE CREEK DIVISION 
AREA 90, CODE 47 
Ruling on the Parties' Cross-Motions for 
Summary Judgment 
Civil No. 560800056 
Judge Samuel P. Chiara 
This matter is presently before the Court on Motions for Summary Judgment filed by 
water right claimants the Willis A. and Wilma Hammerschmid Trust ("Hammerschmid"), 
EnerVest Operating, LLC ("EnerVest"), as well as a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed 
by water right claimant Michael Carlson ("Carlson"). Water Right Claimants Gary and Nancy 
Motte oppose Carlson's motion and join in the motions ofEnerVest and Hammerschmid. 
At issue is whether water rights 90-24, -184, -185, -186, -187, -188, -189, -190, -191 , 
-196, -197, and -299 ("Water Rights") on Minnie Maud Creek in Carbon County were properly 
determined to be owned by Minnie Maud Irrigation and Reservoir Company ("Minnie Maud") 
by the State Water Engineer in March of 1964. 
Each of the parties included a statement of undisputed facts in support of its motion. 
Additionally, some parties offered statements of additional facts in response briefs that were in 
some cases the same facts offered in support of original motions. The actual facts are largely 
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undisputed. Many of the disputes to stated facts are actually disputes regarding what inferences 
may be drawn or what the legal conclusions flow from a fact. The Court finds that the following 
facts are undisputed and are material to the Court's determination of this case. 
l. In about March of 1902, some users of water from Minnie Maud Creek filed Articles of 
Incorporation with the State of Utah. 
2. The Articles state that "[Minnie Maud] shall and does hereby purchase, take, receive and 
hold all water rights now held and claimed by the several incorporators hereto, of and to 
the waters of said Minnie Maud Creek in Carbon County, Utah . . . " Article XIV. 
3. The Articles state that the "[Water Rights] and canals now owned by the individual 
appropriators along [Minnie Maud] creek, who are incorporators hereto, ... is conveyed 
by the respective owners thereof to this corporation for 2 thousand 3 hundred and 77 
shares of stock .... " Article XV. 
4. The Articles state, "[t]hat the said water rights and canals now owned by the individual 
appropriators along said creek, who are incorporators hereto, are reasonably worth the 
sum of Two Thousand Three Hundred and 77 dollars, and said property is conveyed by 
the respective owners thereof to this corporation for 2 thousand 3 hundred and 77 shares 
of stock at the par value thereof, issued to the owners and claimants in proportion to the 
value of their rights ... " Article XV. 
5. The Articles state that "[t]his corporation shall not be effective for any of the purposes 
mentioned herein until at least 3000 shares of the unpaid portion of the capital stock shall 
have been subscribed." Article XVI. 
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6. The Articles state that only 2,377 shares of Minnie Maud stock were subscribed for and 
taken by the persons identified therein, including 260 shares being issued to T.F. 
Housekeeper. Article II. 
7. The Articles state that "[t]he directors may sell [treasury stock] in payment of work done 
and for ... the construction of reservoirs, canals, and other useful and necessary 
improvements to the irrigation system of Minnie Maud Creek." Article XVI. 
8. As set forth in the Articles, only 2,377 shares of stock in Minnie Maud were initially 
subscribed. 
9. There is no direct evidence, either documentary or testimonial, that Minnie Maud ever 
subscribed or issued any shares in addition to the original 2,377. 
10. On April 11, 1902, the Utah Secretary of State issued a certificate of incorporation to 
Minnie Maud. The certificate reads, in part: 
and that there has also been filed in my office with said certificate, a copy 
of the articles of agreement; and oath or affirmation, certified by said 
Clerk; that said articles contain the statement of facts required by law, and 
that said corporation is hereby constituted a body corporate, with right of 
succession as specified in its said articles of agreement, and is hereby 
authorized to exercise all the functions, enjoy all the privileges of a 
Corporation, and to transact all business of said Corporation, as specified 
in its said articles of agreement. 
11. By a deed dated May 12, 1902, each of the incorporators conveyed all of his/her water 
rights on Minnie Maud Creek to Minnie Maud Reservoir and Irrigation Company. 
12. Sometime before July 28, 1905, Minnie Maud filed an action "to determine and quiet its 
right to the waters of Minnie Maud creek, ... and to enjoin [Martha Grames] from 
interfering with, or from diverting or using, or asserting any rights to the use of [ water 
from Minnie Maud Creek]." The parties to that action were Minnie Maud and Martha 
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Grames. Martha Grames prevailed in the action. The Court's decree does not purport to 
determine any water rights on Minnie Maud Creek other than between the parties to suit, 
namely, Grames and Minnie Maud. Grames and the Minnie Maud organizers were not 
the only water users on Minnie Maud Creek at the time of suit. See, Utah State 
Engineer's Water Right Index for Minnie Maud Creek, attached as Exhibit B to 
Hammerschmid's Memorandum in opposition to Carlson's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
13. "Right after the company was organized, all the water users on Minnie Maud Creek went 
to work with hand tools, teams and scrapers to build the reservoir up Minnie Maud 
Canyon .... " Affidavit of David Anderson 
14. The reservoir was completed in about 1905. It washed out between 1911 and 1913. The 
reservoir stored high water from Minnie Maud Creek when it was available. On one 
occasion, Ed Lee, one of the incorporators, asked David Anderson and Fred Grames to 
open the headgate on the reservoir to release water to Lee for his tum. See, Affidavit of 
David Anderson. 
15. Anderson testified that he left the area in 1911 at the age of twenty-nine. Anderson 
declared that prior to his departure he was unaware of the existence of a water master and 
stated that the water users took their water from their own places of diversion. The water 
was not regulated nor controlled by Minnie Maud. See, Affidavit of David Anderson. 
16. Between 1902 and 1955, Minnie Maud conducted meetings and issued stock certificates. 
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17. On August 1, 1962, T. A. Christensen, purporting to act as a director of Minnie Maud, 
wrote a letter to the Utah State Engineer stating that Minnie Maud had subscribed a total 
of only 2,377 shares of stock. 
18. There is no evidence that Minnie Maud attempted to transfer or convey the Water Rights 
to its shareholders or others. 
19. The State Engineer issued the Proposed Determination in March, 1964, which listed 
Minnie Maud as the owner of the Water Rights. 
20. In the fall of 1964, Bernard Iriart, Albert Thayn, William Dause, Amber Kee, Louse 
Motte, Cliver and Myrtle Mae Sprouse, and Willis A. and Wilma Hammerschid, filed 
objections to the Proposed Determination. A common element of the objections is the 
claim that the Proposed Determination was incorrect because it listed Minnie Maud as the 
owner of the Water Rights. 
21. On October 1, 1964, Clive and Myrtle Sprouse and Willis and Wilma 
Hammerschmid filed an objection (the "Objection") to the Proposed 
Determination. 
22. The Hammershmid Objection, which was verified by Willis 
Hammerschmid, provides that the Sprouses had contracted to sell the real 
property identified in the Proposed Determination to the Hammerschmids, 
"together with the water rights thereunto belonging including irrigation, 
domestic, cullinary [sic] and stock watering belonging to the said land." 
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23. The Hammershmid Objectors challenged the State Engineer's proposal 
that title to the Water Rights be vested in Minnie Maud on several verified 
bases, including: 
a. The land, and the Water Rights applied to the land, belonged to the 
Objectors, not to Minnie Maud. Objection at 2. 
b. Minnie Maud was defunct and non-existent, and had been so for 
many years. Objection at 2. 
c. Minnie Maud failed to carry out the purpose for which it was 
purported to have been organized and never distributed water to 
the Objectors, to any of the stockholders or any of their 
predecessors-in-interest. Objection at 2. 
d. Minnie Maud failed to build or maintain dams, canals or ditches to 
convey and distribute the water from Minnie Maud Creek. 
Objection at 2. 
e. Minnie Maud never levied assessments on or exercised jurisdiction 
or control over the water from Minnie Maud Creek. Objection at 2. 
f. Water under the Water Rights has been diverted by the Objectors 
and their predecessors-in-interest from the natural channel by dams 
and ditches belonging to them and their predecessors-in-interest, 
and said water has been used by them and their 
predecessors-in-interest under claim ofright upon their lands for 
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irrigation and stock watering purposes without any control or 
supervision by Minnie Maud since at least 1918. Objection at 2-3. 
g. Legal title to the water rights represented by Claim Nos. 188, 189 
and 190 has never been conveyed to Minnie Maud by the 
Objectors or any of their predecessors-in-interest. Objection at 3. 
h. If Minnie Maud ever acquired or otherwise had any right, title or 
interest in or to the Water Rights, any such title was lost by the 
adverse use of the Objectors and their predecessors-in-interest. 
Since at least 1918, the Objectors and their predecessor put the 
water to beneficial use which was continuous, open, notorious and 
adverse to the purported rights of Minnie Maud. Objection at 3. 
24. On November 9, 1974, the Utah Secretary of State issued a Certificate oflnvoluntary 
Dissolution of Minnie Maud. 
25. On June 28, 2000, Michael Carlson submitted a letter to the Utah Division of Water 
Rights (Division), agreeing that Minnie Maud "issued 2,377 shares of stock .... " 
Analysis 
Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ehlers & Ehlers Architects v. 
Carbon County, 805 P.2d 789, 791 (Utah App. 1991); Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). The facts and 
evidence are viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. America Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 957 (Utah App. 1989). Each of the parties in this case contend that the 
undisputed facts are sufficient to allow the Court to rule as a matter of law. 
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The issue before the Court is whether Minnie Maud existed as an entity and was capable 
of owning the Water Rights in question. The owners of the Water Rights delivered a deed 
purporting to convey their water rights to Minnie Maud on May 12, 1902. If Minnie Maud was a 
properly formed entity, capable of acting, then it owned the Water Rights from that date until it 
was divested of those rights. 
EnerVest rightly points out that interests in real property cannot be conveyed to a 
nonexistent entity. The rule is clearly set forth in Sharp v. Riekhof. 747 P.2d 1044, 1046 (Utah 
1987). Quoting Rixford v. Zeigler, 150 Cal. 435, 88 P. 1092, 1093 (1907), the Utah Supreme 
Court stated: 
[A] deed of conveyance is void unless the grantee named is 
capable of talcing and holding the property named in the deed; and 
the general rule also is that to make a deed effective the grantee 
must be a person, either natural or artificial, capable of taking and 
holding the property. 
The deed in this case names Minnie Maud Reservoir and Irrigation Company as grantee. Thus, 
the first critical issue is whether Minnie Maud was a corporation, capable of taking and holding 
property. 
Carlson argues that Minnie Maud was a de jure corporation. A de jure corporation is one 
that has been regularly created in compliance with all legal requirements and has the right to 
exercise a corporate franchise that is invulnerable against attack by the state in quo warranto 
proceedings. 18A Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 184. There is no undisputed fact presented by any 
party that supports the position that Minnie Maud was not created in complete compliance with 
the laws of the State of Utah. On April 11, 1902 the Utah Secretary of State issued a certificate 
of incorporation. Pursuant to statutory authority in effect at the time, that certificate was 
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evidence of de jure incorporation and was "sufficient to constitute the association of a body 
corporate." See, Utah Rev. Stat. §11-1-319 (1898). Other authorities cited by Carlson support 
the position that the certificate of incorporation is conclusive evidence of the de jure existence of 
the corporation. See, Do/bear v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 126 U.S. 1,571 (1888). This Court 
concludes that the material facts surrounding the incorporation of Minnie Maud require the 
Court to hold, as a matter oflaw, that Minnie was a de jure corporation no later than April 11, 
1902. 
This Court's holding that Minnie Maud was a de jure corporation precludes the position 
that Minnie Maud was a de facto corporation. A corporation de facto exists where there has been 
a good faith attempt to organize a corporation, there has been colorable compliance with 
statutory requirements, and the organization has exercised corporate powers. 18A Am. Jur. 2d 
Corporations § 184. De facto corporations exist where efforts to comply with statutory 
incorporation requirements have fallen short. Here, Minnie Maud was in compliance with State 
statute and cannot qualify as de facto because its efforts at incorporation had not failed. 
The next item of inquiry is whether Minnie Maud, as a de jure corporation, had authority 
to receive delivery of the Water Rights on May 12, 1902, when the deed purporting to transfer 
those rights was signed by the incorporators and others who held water right interests on the 
creek. Unrestrained, a corporation generally may hold legal title to real property. However, 
incorporators may limit the authority of a corporation to act through the corporation's articles of 
incorporation and bylaws which act as a contract between the members and the corporation. "It 
is well established precedent that the bylaws of a corporation, together with the articles of 
incorporation, the statute under which it was incorporated, and the member's application, 
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constitute a contract between the member and the corporation." Okelberry v. W Daniels Land 
Ass'n, 120 P.3d 34, 39 (Utah Ct. App. 2005)(citation omitted). The articles and bylaws also form 
a contract among the members themselves. See, id. (citation omitted). Further, a corporation 
"may not act in any way not authorized in its ... articles of incorporation or bylaws." Id. 
(citation omitted). Thus, should incorporators decide among themselves to create a corporation 
that cannot hold title to real property, they may contract to do so and embody that contract in the 
articles and bylaws of the corporation. Additionally, corporations may exist and have temporary 
limitation imposed upon the corporation's authority to operate. See, Murphy v. Crosland, 886 
P.2d 74, 83 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) .aff4., 915 P.2d 491 (Utah 1996). 
The certificate of incorporation issued to Minnie Maud expressly states that, "[Minnie 
Maud] is hereby authorized to exercise all the functions, enjoy all the privileges of a 
Corporation, and to transact all business of said Corporation, as specified in its said articles of 
agreement." (emphasis added). Minnie Maud's articles state, in pertinent part, "[t]his 
corporation shall not be effective for any of the purposes mentioned herein until at least 3000 
shares of the unpaid portion of the capital stock shall have been subscribed." Article XVI. "In 
the interpretation of a contract, the parties' intentions are controlling. If the contract is in writing 
and its language is not ambiguous, the parties' intentions should be determined from the words 
of the agreement." Turner v. Hi-Country Homeowners Ass'n, 910 P.2d 1223, 1225-26 (Utah 
1996)( citation omitted). Here, the language of the parties' written contract is not ambiguous. 
Minnie Maud was given authority by the certificate of incorporation to transact business as 
specified in its articles. The unambiguous language of the articles states that Minnie Maud has 
no authority to act until 3,000 shares of capital stock have been subscribed. Thus, Minnie Maud, 
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although a de jure corporation, was limited in its ability to act until 3,000 shares were subscribed. 
Until such time, Minnie Maud had no authority pursuant to the agreement of its own members to 
hold title to any property. 
It is an undisputed fact that only 2,377 shares of stock in Minnie Maud were initially 
subscribed. It is also undisputed that there is no direct documentary or testimonial evidence that 
any additional shares were ever subscribed. As late as 1962, one person who apparently believed 
in the corporate existence of Minnie Maud, and purporting to act as a director, wrote a letter to 
the Utah State Engineer stating that Minnie Maud had subscribed a total of only 2,377 shares of 
stock. Further, Carlson himself, in June, 2000, submitted a letter to the Utah Division of Water 
Rights (Division), agreeing that Minnie Maud "issued 2,377 shares of stock .... " Now Carlson 
appears to challenge the fact that only 2,377 shares were subscribed in his response to 
EnerVest's statement of undisputed fact number 13. Carlson states, "[b]ased on additional 
research into the records and history of Minnie Maud, there is a reasonable inference that either 
additional shares were issued to meet the 3000-share threshold or that the requirement was 
waived." Combined Reply in Support of Carlson's Motion for Summary Judgment in Favor of 
the Proposed Determination at xvii. Carlson points out that Minnie Maud's articles of 
incorporation allow its directors to issue stock in payment for construction of reservoirs and that 
the waters users on Minnie Maud Creek went to work building a reservoir on the creek between 
1902 and 1905. Apparently, as additional support for the inference, Carlson points to the 
circumstantial evidence that Minnie Maud held meetings, kept minutes, levied assessments, and 
pursued litigation. Although Carlson seemingly challenges the fact the no more than 3,000 
shares were subscribed in the "Consolidated Statements of Fact, Responses, and Replies" section 
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of his memorandum, Carlson does nothing to develop or advance his position in the "Argument" 
section. In the "Argument" section, Carlson is silent on both the law and its application 
regarding inferences used to defeat undisputed statements of fact. Carlson's memorandum fails 
to provide the Court with any legal authority or argument regarding factual inferences and 
wholly abandons what appears to be an earlier request that the Court infer that 3,000 shares were 
subscribed. Instead, Carlson's argument focuses only on the aspect of waiver of the 3,000 share 
condition. See, id. at 5. 
This Court declines to draw the inference that Carlson seeks. Carlson is only entitled to 
reasonable inferences drawn from undisputed facts. See, USA Power v. PacificCorp, 236 P.3d 
749, 757 (Utah 2010). The Court cannot resort to mere speculation. See, Harding v. Atlas Title 
Ins. Agency, Inc., 285 P.3d 1260, 1262 (Utah Ct. App. 2012). Carlson has not provided the 
Court with any legal argument or analysis to support a position that the Court should infer that 
perhaps 3,000 shares were subscribed. Courts are not required to consider matters that are not 
adequately argued. See, eg., Am. Fork City v. Hulet, 293 P.3d 378, 379-80 (Utah 2012) (An 
issue is inadequately briefed "when the overall analysis of the issue is so lacking as to shift the 
burden of research and argument to the reviewing court.")( citation omitted). 
Because the Court declines to infer that 3,000 shares were subscribed, Minnie Maud 
acted ultra vires when it accepted delivery of the deed of the Water Rights in May of 1902. 
Because a conveyance is void unless the grantee named is capable of taking and holding the 
property named in the deed, the purported conveyance of the Water Rights here would have been 
void. See, Sharp v. Riekhof, 747 P.2d 1044, 1046 (Utah 1987). Such conclusion and result are 
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inevitable unless the undisputed facts also support the legal determination that the incorporators 
and shareholders of Minnie Maud waived the 3,000 share condition. 
"A party to a contract, who is entitled to demand performance of a condition precedent, 
may waive the same, either expressly or by acts evidencing such intention; and perfonnance of a 
condition precedent to taking effect of the contract may be waived by the acts of the parties in 
treating the agreement as in effect." Becker v. HSA/Wexford Bancgroup, L.L.C., 157 F. Supp. 2d 
1243, 1251-52 (D. Utah 200l)(quoting Ahrendt v. Bobbitt, 229 P.2d 296,297 (Utah 1951). 
Minnie Maud was a dejure corporation in May 1902. The only thing preventing it from 
holding title to the Water Rights was the contractual condition precedent, evidenced by the 
corporate articles, that required that 3,000 shares be subscribed before the corporation had 
authority to act. That contractual covenant was binding upon the shareholders and upon the 
corporation but was also capable of modification and subject to waiver. At the time the 
incorporators and shareholders executed the deed on May 12, 1902, they were presumably aware 
of the condition precedent. The articles of incorporation were newly minted and the certificate 
of incorporation was only a month old. They were a small group and the articles of 
incorporation identified the nine incorporators and the number of shares held by each. And yet, 
aware that only 2,377 shares had been subscribed, or at least unconcerned about requiring proof 
that the condition had been met, each of the incorporators and other water interest holders 
transferred his and her Water Rights to the corporation. As beneficiaries of the contractual 
agreement, every one of the stockholders was entitled to demand performance of the condition 
precedent. Any of the shareholders and any of the directors might have demanded that Minnie 
Maud not hold title to the Water Rights until the required number shares were subscribed. But 
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instead, each of them acted overtly, evidenced their intention to waive the condition precedent, 
and treated the corporation as being in effect by deeding real property interests to the 
corporation. The Court finds that the shareholders' act of executing and delivering a deed of the 
Water Rights to Minnie Maud demonstrates the shareholders' clear intention of waiving 
performance of a condition precedent and treating the agreement as in effect. See, Ahrendt v. 
Bobbitt, 229 P.2d 296,297 (Utah 1951). The otherwise ultra vires act of Minnie Maud was 
thereby ratified by the each of the shareholders, incorporators, directors, and Water Rights 
owners. 
The other purported corporate acts by Minnie Maud and its shareholders are not of great 
import in this ruling. Whether Minnie Maud was authorized to levy assessments or pursue 
litigation isn't at issue. Only Minnie Maud's capacity to own and hold the Water Rights is being 
litigated. And for at least that purpose, each of the shareholders and the corporation itself waived 
the condition precedent and treated the agreement as in effect. Minnie Maud, thus, being a de 
jure corporation in the eyes of the State, and each of the shareholders having waived the 
condition precedent with regard to the corporation's authority and capacity to possess real 
property, became the legal owner of the Water Rights on May 12, 1902. 
Hammershmid opposes Carlson's Motion for Summary Judgment and the Proposed 
Determination arguing that if Minnie Maud was legal owner of the water rights in 1902, 
Hammershmid acquired title to its water rights prior to 1939 through adverse possession. This 
same claim was made by the Hammershmid predecessors in their challenge to the Proposed 
Determination in October of 1964. 
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In Utah, prior to 1939, a party could acquire title to water by adverse possession. See, 
Otter Creek Reservoir Co. v. New Escalante Irrigation Co., 203 P.3d 1015, 1018-19 (Utah 
2009). A claimant obtains adverse title to water rights when the claimant exercises continuous, 
uninterrupted, hostile, notorious, adverse enjoyment under a claim of title with the knowledge 
and acquiescence of the person having the prior right. See, Wellsville E. Field Irr. Co. v. Lindsay 
Land & Livestock Co., 137 P.2d 634,641 (1943). In order to successfully oppose Carlson's 
Summary Judgment, Hammershmid must propound undisputed material facts that support the 
elements of adverse possession. In its support, Hammershmid provided a Statement of 
Additional Facts. Of those purported facts, only the following have any bearing on the issue of 
adverse possession and relate in any way to the period prior to 1939. 
4. On October I, 1964, Clive and Myrtle Sprouse and Willis and 
Wilma Hamrnerschmid filed an objection (the "Objection") to the 
Proposed Determination. A copy of the Objection is attached 
hereto as Exhibit H. 
5. The Objection, which was verified by Willis Hamrnerschmid, 
provides that the Sprouses had contracted to sell the real property 
identified in the Proposed Determination to the Hammerschmids, 
"together with the water rights thereunto belonging including 
irrigation, domestic, cullinary [sic] and stock watering belonging to 
the said land." Objection at 1. 
6. The Objectors challenged the State Engineer's proposal that title 
to the Water Rights be vested in Minnie Maud on several verified 
bases, including: 
a. The land, and the Water Rights applied to the land, belonged to 
the Objectors, not to Minnie Maud. Objection at 2. 
b. Minnie Maud was defunct and non-existent, and had been so for 
many years. Objection at 2. 
c. Minnie Maud failed to carry out the purpose for which it was 
purported to have been organized and never distributed water to 
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the Objectors, to any of the stockholders or any of their 
predecessors-in-interest. Objection at 2. 
d. Minnie Maud failed to build or maintain dams, canals or ditches 
to convey and distribute the water from Minnie Maud Creek. 
Objection at 2. 
e. Minnie Maud never levied assessments on or exercised 
jurisdiction or control over the water from Minnie Maud Creek. 
Objection at 2. 
f. Water under the Water Rights has been diverted by the Objectors 
and their predecessors-in-interest from the natural channel by dams 
and ditches belonging to them and their predecessors-in-interest, 
and said water has been used by them and their 
predecessors-in-interest under claim of right upon their lands for 
irrigation and stock watering purposes without any control or 
supervision by Minnie Maud since at least 1918. Objection at 2-3. 
g. Legal title to the water rights represented by Claim Nos. 188, 
189 and 190 has never been conveyed to Minnie Maud by the 
Objectors or any of their predecessors-in-interest. Objection at 3. 
h. If Minnie Maud ever acquired or otherwise had any right, title or 
interest in or to the Water Rights, any such title was lost by the 
adverse use of the Objectors and their predecessors-in-interest. 
Since at least 1918, the Objectors and their predecessor put the 
water to beneficial use which was continuous, open, notorious and 
adverse to the purported rights of Minnie Maud. Objection at 3. 
The foregoing is of little use in determining whether Hammershmid's predecessors in 
interest possessed the Water Rights by adverse possession. First, the Objection referred to above 
was verified only by Willis Hammerscmid (not Sprouse) and it fails to affirm that the statements 
are based upon Willis Hammershmid's personal knowledge. See, U.R.C.P. 56(c)(4), (stating, 
"An affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose a motion must be made on personal 
knowledge, must set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and must show that the 
affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated."). The statement also contains 
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no details upon which the Court can infer that the statements were based on Willis 
Hammershmid's personal knowledge. See, id. For example, the statement does not set forth 
when Willis Hammershmid took possession of the property. Thus, the Court cannot determine 
from the statement whether Willis Hammershmid had any personal knowledge of the use of the 
water from Minnie Maud Creek prior to 1939 and during the relevant period. Second, 
paragraphs 6 a, b, g and h are not statements of fact but are legal conclusions. Third, 
paragraphs 6 c, and d, if true, are not relevant to Hammershmid's adverse possession claim. 
Thus, the only material portions of the quoted material is contained in paragraphs 6 e and f and 
state that Willis Hammershmid's predecessors in interest used the Water Rights without any 
control or supervision of Minnie Maud since 1918. 
Even assuming, which this Court does not, that Willis Hammershmid had personal 
knowledge of the purported use of the Water Rights between 1918 and 1939, the claimed fact 
does not support the legal conclusion that the use was hostile and adverse to Minnie Maud. 
Hammershmid's successors in interest owned shares in Minnie Maud and were thus entitled to 
use their aliquot share of water from the creek. There are no facts that have been propounded in 
these various motions that supports the idea that Hammershmid's predecessors took more water 
between 1918 and 1939 than to which they would have been entitled by their ownership of 
Minnie Maud stock. Mere use of water to which they were clearly entitled would have been 
insufficient to put Minnie Maud on notice that Hammersmid's predecessors were asserting an 
adverse claim to the water. See, Otwell v. Clark, 658 P.2d 585, 588 (Utah 1982); see also, 
Mathews v. Baker, 155 P. 427,428 (Utah 1916). 
17 
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The Court concludes that Hammershmid has failed to support its claim of adverse 
possession. 
Minnie Maud continued its de jure existence until November 9, 1974. There is no 
evidence it ever divested itself of the Water Rights. Thus, the Court concludes that the State 
Water Engineer correctly determined that the Water Rights were owned by Minnie Maud in 
March of 1964. 
Carlson's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. The Motions of Hamrnershmid and 
EnerVest are denied. r-~ 
DATED this~ day of January, 2016. 
District Court Judge 
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T'nis agreement made and entered into this 27th day oi' l~ch, 
. . 
1902 by and between the parties whose names are hereunto subscribed, WITNESSETR: 
TRA.T WRE:REAS, the undersign1:d bei~ ~esirous of associating themselves together 
f'or the l)ur:po_se· of cons_tructing, purchasing and oynil:lg water reservoirs, ditches, 
and canals , and other means of controlling and distributing waters for irrigation 
and domestic_~~? and for the :pur_pose ·of appropri ating, purchasillg, omrlDg =d 
~tributing water for ·irrigation and .domestic use 'to the stockholders iIJ. this 
corporati on, and of fo=ing a corporation for that purpose; Now,~, the 
undersigned a majority of us being reside~ts of the ~ta.te of Utah, pursuant to 
the laws of the State oi' Utah do hereby certi:ry, declaxe, arid agree as follows: 
. 1. 
This corporation called and known by the name of the Minnie 1-f.atld 
Reservoir and Irrigation Comp"'....ny, and. it sbalJ. be and is form~d and organized 
at Minnie Maud Precinct, Ca:rbon County, State o:f Utah. 
11, 
The names of ~he incorporators hereo~, their residences, and the 
amount of stock sullscribed. and taken by each, are as follows: to-wit: 
Johnston & Son 
E, And.erson 
.r. A. Hamilton 
WiJJ.i= Hamilton 
T , F , Housekeeper 
A. 0, Smith 
Alonzo Kelger 
Da.v::i,d 'Russell 
RESIDENCES 
Eorper 
11 
" 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
• II 
lll. 
NO.SBA.'l'lES 
1202 
39 
68 
(not named) 
260 
14-3 
182 
227 
PAR VAIDE 
,$l. OO each 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
n 
II 
'Th.e.t the corporation herein prov:i.ded. for, and hereby created, shall 
exist and continue for the te-"'111 of one hundred, y~a.i:s, unless sooner dissolved. 
and. disincorporated according to law. 
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lV, 
That the objects, busine·ss and :pursu:1ts of this .corp:,ration shall 
be to c~nstruct, purchase, a.nd own, reservoirs, ditches and canals in Ca:cbon 
County, Utah, and to :purchase, ap:propriate and receive and own waters and 
water rights and to distribute to its seve:ral ~tockholders waters owned by it, 
according to their respectiYe boJ.d.ings oi' capital stock in said company, and 
especia~ to purchase, rec.eive and own the canals, ·waters, ana. water rights 
nmr owned by the severa.'1 residents and. app:rppriators of water on and along 
Min..:.ie Maud Creek in Nine M:i.le Canyon, Carbon County, Ut?,h and it is intended 
thE.t this corporation shall succeed to the property rights of said residents 
and appropriators , in the waters and ditches a.'rid canals of said Mipnie Maud 
Creek.' 
v. 
The general office of this corporation sha'.)...l be at 1'!.innie Maud 
Precinct, Carbon County, Utab., where shall ~o be this corporation's place . , 
of general business. 
vi. 
The amount of the capital stock of this corporation shall be 
Eight Thousand Dollars divided. into Eight '.I:housand sha:res 9f' the par .value of 
$1. 00 each . 
vn. 
:fue officers o:!.' this cor:poration shall be a Board o.f Five Directors., 
a president, a vice-president, a secretary and' a treasurer. The President, and · 
Vice Pres.id.ent shall be chosen by the ]3oa:rd of Directors from al!!D~ their 
number, and said Board. shall also choose the treasurer a.i:ia. secretary :f'rom the 
stockhold.ers of this cor:po:ration. No per·son shall be deemed. quali.fied. to hold 
office :i.~ this corporation who is not a .sto~kholder therein. 
V1JJ.. 
The i'ollow-i_ng named persons shall be officers of this corp::>ration 
until the first annual mee.ting herein1l,fter provided for and until their 
successors are elected and qualified to-tit: 
E. Anderson, Director a.:ad President 
G. C. Johnston, Director and.Vice President 
E. c. 'Lee, Director and. Secretary 
James Ramilton, Director and Treasu..>-er 
0, A: Smith1 Director 
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/lIJy vacancy caused in any office herein ~rovided for by resignation,· death, 
or~ remova.1, shall be. f.illecl by :t;he Boa.rd ,of .Directors, until the· next gene:raJ. 
meeting of the stockholders, A majority of the Boa:rd of' Di.1"ectors shall con-
stitute a quorum for the transaction of the business of this corporation. 
]X. 
. The term of office of "the officers oi' this corporation sball be 
for one year and until their successors are du~ elected and qualified, un-
less they sooner resign or are removed. 
x. 
Tb.ere sbalJ. be an allD.ual stockholders' meeting for the election oi' 
officers and for the t~nsaction of· such other bus:illess as shall lawfully 
come before -it, which shall. be held on the f'i.1"st Monday of' the month of 
Me.rch1 of each and every year, at ten o'clock A,M. at the general office of 
this corporation, at Minnie lf.caud Precinct, Carbon County, Utah. A repre-
sentation of' the =jority of the stock owned by the several stockholders 
here:f shall be necessary to hold said n:eeting and , transact business, but 
less than a. majority of stock may a<l:journ such meeting from t:i:me to time 
until such ma jority of rep:resentation may be obtained. The officers of this 
corporation except such as sball be chosen by the :Boa:rd of Di:rectors, sball 
be elected e.t the annual meetings. SUch election sball be by ballctJ anci. · 
the person receiv-,...ng a majority of votes of the stockholders at such meetil:lg 
shall be held and c'Ecl.E.red to be elected to said offices respectively; and 
each stockholder shall be entitled to as many votes as he holds shares of 
said Capital stock; and represe11tat i on by proxy duly apr.ointed in w.ri ting shall · 
be allowed at all stockho~uers' meetings·whether general or special. 
The first meeting of the corporatio~ for the election of officers 
and other pur:poses as herein provided, shall be held on the first Monday of 
the rccnth of MarchJ 1902 at the houx and. :9lace above stated :for the general 
annuel'meetings of stockholders , A failure to hold any annual or specia l 
stockholders 1 meeting at the time ·:provided for in this agreement shall not_ 
forfeit nor in any manner interefere with the corporate rights acquired under 
this agreement; and a.ny such meeting may be held at any subsequent time) upon 
giving the notice required by law. 
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S!)ecial meetings of the stockholders of this corporation shall be 
called by the· Board of Di.rectors . The Secreta...ry ·shall, or on his failu:re so 
to do any officer. of :this corporation may, give notice of annual and special 
stockholders' meetings, 
Xl. 
The Boaxd of Directors shall. have power to appoint all necessary 
agents, watennasters~ and officers ne·ceesary to carry on its business, and. 
s:b.all make such rules~ reg.tJ..ations and. by-laws as are · nec~ssa:ry and proper 
to manage, control and o:i;e rate its business and pro:9erty, and slE.ll c_ar:ry 
into effect the objects of the corporation. Such by-laws, :ru.J.es and_regula-
tions shall be maci.e by the boBJ;"d of di.rectors, and shall exist subject to the 
alJ1)rOval Of the StOCkhOlderS I at their SUCCeedi.ng a:muaJ. meeting, 
The Boa."'ti of Directors are hereby. aui;:horized. and Sll\POWered to levy 
and collect assessments upon the capital stock of this corporation for tbe 
purpose of carrying on its business as herein agreed upon, and to that extent 
and for-that purpose the. capital stoc.'t hereof is lll3.de assessable. Such 
assessments shall be levied and. collected. in the manner !)rovided by law • . 
Xlll. 
The }?.rivate property or the stockholders of° the corporation shall 
not be liable for tbe debts or llabi.li ties of the corporation. 
XJ.V, 
This corporation shall and does hereby purchase , take, receive and. 
hold all the water rights nm, held =d claimed by the ~evaral incorporators 
hereto, oi' and. to the waters of said Mi=ie Maud Creek in Carbon County, Utah, 
together Vi.th ail canals, <J.Bl!IS, locks·, gat_es and weirs used. therewith th:rough-
out the whole system of ~aid Minnie Maud Irrigation ditches, and the same being 
the ~tches, canals , ~eadgates and rights now owned and claimed by the individ.ua.l 
incorporators hereto, ~ .· . 
It is intend.ea. by this agree=t to incor:porij!-te all the :waters of 
. . \• . . . 
Minnie Ms.ud Creek and. its tr:i.butaries except~ Con Canyon ( ) i'rOlll. "its 
source to Harper :Post Office, commonly called Lee's R~ch, a distance of 
about 30 miles ; to huild a wl construct reservoirs near th<: h ead of said. lf.dlmie 
Maud Creek, and to regulate the distribution of the waters of said creeJ'. and 
:from said reservoirs throughout the entire system covered. by this agreement. 
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xv. 
Tb.at the se.id wate:?:". rights and cana;i.s now O'n"lled by the individual 
ap]?ropriators along said creek, who are incorporators hereto, ,are ree.sone.bly 
worth :the sum of Two Th9usa.nd Three Rundred and. 77 dollars, and said 'property 
is conveyed by the respective oWDers thereof to this corporation for 2 
thousand 3 hundred and. TI she.res oi' stock at" the· par value thereof, issued to 
the owners and claimants in proIJortion to the value of their rights, and. in 
full payment therefor, and said 2 thousand. 3 hundred ·ana. TI shares of stoc.1'; 
are hereby declare'd to be fully paid up capital stock. 
xvi. 
This corj;Jore.tio~ sb2.ll not be effective for e.ny of the purposes 
mentioned herein until at least 3000 shares of the unpaid. portion of the 
capital stock shall have been subscribed. Toe unstibscri"oed. capital stoc.lc 
shall be and is hereby ne.de the property of the corporation. Ta.e directors 
may sell ·the same from time to tiroe and may issue the same i .n payment of 
work done and for the purc:base of water rights and improvements and for the 
construction of' reservoirs; canals, and. other useful and nec_essary :i.mprove-
ments to the irrigation system of Minnie Maud Cree..'!<. And. alJ.. persons holding 
stock under this agreement, shall have the water distributed to them in the 
proportion of their holdi~gs of said stock; and all the shares of stock of 
this corporation," when once issued, shall stand. upon and eq_ual footi.Dg. 
IU WITNESS THEREOF, the parties to these presents have. hereunto 
set their hands and. seals this 27th day of March," l902. 
STATE OF UTJ\.R ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF CARBON ) 
E. C. Lee 
E. Anderson 
J. A. Hamilton (}. c. Johnston 
A, O. Smitb. 
Alonzo Alger 
E .. C. Lee, E. Anderson, and J. A. Hamilton, being first d~ 
S',rorn, each :for him.sell, says: that he is one of the incorporators of the 
Incorporation mentioned .in the foregoing ag:reement; that he and his 
co:j.ncorporators mentioned herein ha.ve commence, and it is bona fide their 
intention to continue the business mentioned ·in the foregoing artickes of 
Agreement, and that each pa.rty to the agreement has :£aid at least ten l)"'...r 
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cent of the stock subscribed by him, and tha.t more than ten per ,cent of the 
capital stock of the cor:9oration bas been paid into. said corporation; end 
aff:iants verily believe that each. :party to the agreement has paid or· :i,S 
able to 'faY and will 'faY tJJ.e amount of' the stock subscribed for by him. 
E. C. Lee 
E. ./1.nderson 
J. A. Ram.:i.lton 
Subscribed a¢ sworn ~o before me this 27th day of March, 1902 
COONTY OF CA.."IIBON 
) 
) 
) 
s. C. Johansen, Justice of tbe Peace 
ss 
I, ff, R ! Donaldson, Cou!!:i;y. Cler}~ in and for the County of Carbon, 
State of Utah, do h~rei:>y certify that the foregoing is a full, true and correct 
copy of the Articles of .Agreement and oath or affirmation of the Miililie Maud 
Reservoir and Irr~gation Company and I fur:t,qer certify ~at the said 
corporation has duly filed in my office the P..greement of Incocyoration, 
toget_her with tbe oath or affirmation oi' tbe incocyorators and oath of 
office of each officer, as required by C'napter 1 of Title ll, Revised 
Statutes of Utah, as amended by Chapter 81 of· the laws of Utah 1901. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my band and affixed· rcy:_ 
official seal this 5th day of April 1902. 
w. H. DONALDSON, com~ CLERK 
(SEAL) 
Filed and certificate issued this llth day of April 1902. 
J. T. HAMMOND, SE~.:RY OF STATE 
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Addendum 3 
f 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF CARSON SS. 
I heroby certify that lhe dpoument to 
wh11ch th is certificate Is attached Is a ful , true. end correct PODY of the 
or gin el !Ilea and now In my custo !l,y . 
~ 01T~t~f,Y han d and see12t8i~:fil'TH 81rrJ1~~t° NJ~:R DER 
By Y-"«2'°4 w h 1 -Recorder/Deputy 
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J.,1 .. •. '..:1.;c::o =..:: t:-.!:on -;.:._: !!",!l od.!l l"!!l•.!, :"!.id :.:~1.~ --r,1ld b<n?·o 
j!"o.:•.t.:.:· la~3 in vllluo1 ::i1::.~ tho c.ro;,s r.ai11cd if,c~eo:1 -:r:l·.!l:t' b .i.11 
li:.:cljh.ooll. ':iot ma.turt, u11l!Wo t'hcr., "j'Crc itt!;atod a...14 "t~o;o:,~17-
t,:lvo l!ttb oi- .:io · Vtlluo,i ~b."l!i. tho soil ot 3!lid. l:i.:1:b, 1a hwO'Tor, 
1'o~tile 1 ··ttncl Wh!)Q G~ia,' l:i:itio lll'O 1:wi:;ntc~ .. Otb.Cr.1180 tb,_on 'b)'. 
n:itu.r~l raintdl, ';hey a::o V0'1!7 praduot~vo .a.n:l e.ro :::,:ea~~:7 on-
hznc<id :I.Ji ,rnlu.e, . ... . . '. . 
'· ll, 'l!bat !:he · !il~t U.t' ho;,ein I ud ,:1., 1,rodGoobao:rs· 1A 
i;i,tore3t 0hayo,' r.;r·nol'e hh!m Zeveut;t (70) 700::c iuat ;.e.c~, -~-. 
riGat"ed the land.1 ~i!roiWl.bove de:ao.rib.~ and iu div.er:Oin5 !or b.t 
~W:!,)0Se, 011 thG plnintitf'q l.nnd, all tho VtitOr l!.8CEl:J:Jnr.1 for . 
such ~i3Ution '!roD G:d! !.!iDnie J~ue_ ~reek, . { 
• : 
0
.12, ~..e,t !or GOVO::oJ. :'CL""& ~!.o.r. to the C~::!ea.c·eiz:'3?1t Of L 
•) 
this il.ct:lo:11; tho derend(l!lts, 'l!,· P. '!I:>~ekeo!ler, Bud Jlirhtensen, . : 
'..!hem.as Obrlstonsen, aua I .A:be:: ~eel.. h:t.vc diverl.ed ~,.;e q~t:iea • A 
, . . .. 
. ot,w11tc above th!l . . la.nd'of 1:he :;,laintii':t, heroina'bovo deaoribed, f 
. 11nci ,oa~h ot ~he.i, :tor more than 'his ,:lust cu;>.d due proportion 'there- f . 
'b;r, ailusins fih~ d;i¢nu~_io'u Of cile' Btra~ 0~ e.lid ~t~:t' Of'. ~8 . . l , . 
liauit' Oreek, so .tlo~ to tte s:lid :;il:lint11'i''s lwid. to the extecif :; J 
·. ·t:imt ~itl:le '1:i: ~ W!l.to1" reao~es the lrl'n4? of· the :plid.nt~' a:14· : ' : 
· dexri~. it of the ne~~~se.r,y \;a.Ver .for hriu&,tion and d0.l!lest1o · ... · J 
)lSeJ. a:i.d 01' ,his jjuat ppoportion C?f' so.id w:ito1:' to t~o s:rea1. d~gel ( 
encl ,iaj~ of the "plaintiff and t~ca.tened to contizme to d.o ~o, · : : · 
• • • • • ., ,. I t • ' 
·for wb.ich·s~ 1i!Jl117 ~lcdntii'.t hos . no adel1Wlto·%'emeq at .la~.· 
. : .· ·. :.13. 'J!hnt the'.~aid de.tealante, 'l. li'.;Bouseteepez,;·,hd .. 
••• .. • • • .. • • • •• .. ._, 'I 
. , :obristansen, 'J!hocies 'Obristeasen and .\mber'Xeel, £or the pa.st s'eve,rn.l . . \. 
. ~ - . . .,. . ,~ . ' . .. , .. . . . . . ) 
' . · .:res.re:, divertiea: anll oo.n-~ea. a large amount of w:ber ~-Jaid .. . , . ;. · ·.~ 
t ,. • • • I • • • f 
· ·• •Mimiie Jlaud 'Creek and. fi'OJ:I its ?r.:.tc)r Shed1 to nevJ.y bro!tet:1. and. • .. 
. ,'cultivuted ~ ~ are no·., ~o di.vertiD5 iod c~ awa;r 'so.id, • . 
=.Ja\e~' 'tro:m -so.id ·sLm!e t:aud Creek to the ,gre.s.t loss and iajDZ7 -~o·· : · · , 
,; .. . ' . . . . . . . •, : . . 
,. ·the' .. plaia.ti.tt and. t:roate.i.ed. to oon!:;inue to do u~. · :· 
· · 14. ibiat ·tho· TIB.ters· o~ · sa.ia Bff~~ ue' ot n 41.:terent'. 
' · ·volu:e"in o.o;sordance·w:i.th the ilf.tueu.t· se:isona in tho year1 'that 
.\ • • • • • • •• • • • • "'I' 
the:.-o is auttioient na.ter'in said ore~:t'o 1.rrigatfe all the ori:;1-
. . . . . . . ,. . . . . .. . . 
. . 
' 
•'WU:~ t~t' ,'rJas-~d.~ c'!1ti.vatt?, a.1:·1~ -~µie,"tl!at','-tbo ~e· . . 
I• : '~! ;'f 
,, 
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c:-. -:.~ ' !.:.•.:..::. ~~1-! ::..•e.~:: ·.:* ~./_ :'O!"J:.!.a.~qJ. b;; ·.!io :::i~!',~c:,: ,r~ l.i 
'!. :.;~~·.;~ ,! ~·~, . ~~ic.1 1!1 tl.i·J ~o~i::,:a, :-- .l eat c;::.o ~!. .. o ~1:::t, :::.c 
~~.:.~asa!:1 oa;po~.1bl;,:: ::::.~ o:- ~"li~w, !~ ~o(!. i:i ~ ~-oa.:.,o:mblo, 
~o-, :u::!.,~l -:-:i,t .'Jo:icr~oi:ll '3:-.;,·, : ro·l.i~lad ~,10 i)..,..o or i!ivi::J~!ln enil 
c.i:,t:-!.bullion :t s:u.l ,1ote:- 1o had, o.nd t!\~t t~a. pl:i!cti!.f" t.(n.'ein, 
'b~ · ~l:o a-iid aol:o of: llhi, d~i'en:bn~s ,· :.l:\:l o:'lc!l o:!:' i;~u,cT t\S 11!0:c::-
; 0:tid., ~ de;,riv.-i.~ of i1i3,• ju.st Md. Cl1U1 tllble :sh-,.::o ot :;:iid m;.c:o:-~·; . . . 
. ~rul, t:i!at ~:10 ~u:Jt :mcl o:uit:i':>lo e:i:u-o ot o-:iid ~tbo: ~or s:dd l,:1.1\1 
ot .ylaic.ti:Ci' is, 31:;:li:r' (60;~) :,c:- oen~ , ot ~!:o •N:i';;c:- i:i ::ix!e or in 
.. vol~e ao n0':7i,:1;: 1:1. s:iid c=ocl:. , : . · 
15. "ihat the d~.femlnQ,t:c· b.orein, ~. '1. I~~C::eeplll:'9 •3ud. 
9~!stcmse':1, 'llloc:ta Jliristense:i, 11:ld Aci?er ;:eel, 11:1.ve wil!\l:!:11', · 
i:::ioui;l;l;y, t::'OD.::;.tull,1, ua.liciously antl unla..-tul.1:, '1verted i:na. • i 
.. ~~· rll!u.12-f, !..--;io·.:ill.1~, ~ons;i'Ull;r, ~lio!ou.:ly end u:il.~: 
dimtb.:;, o.nd Wlleu e:jo!u~d 'lT.i orde~ .;,f ~bis ho~orab1e court 
~ill co:?1tinu!3 to ;-;Jilfull;r, knw~, ~·J;Lgi.~, w,.J.1ci9'1,Sl;r :• ~ 
• and unle.~ d1~ort a..U or alnoat' a1l eho 'Ir.I.ten 0~ o:1id ,~b . 1·.:· 
.~ud Or~'.41 :;.t ~oint~ u'bovo :;j\3 'l.!mll!& OJ: tllo l)lainti!i' hero~. 
,above rBrtj,cularli de3cribed, ~~e°b)" 'Tfbolly depri~~ the plaint- ,·. 
• 111'£ of :us. just. OJ!4 e~it:iblo sbaro of ';!le 0'Jatera of s"?.14 ,area:.:.. • { 
' · '..~:lilf :plain.iii.ff )T'QJ'SI ' : • ' 
• I 
1. T!!at tho Court ASoerta.i:l l;b.e mount oE nntcr :belo??,...~ · ~ 
ills l;o' each o! . bt~ ,artieo l;e.."'13~ tro~ said ~e i.?aud bel:. ; 
· 2. '?bnt _ao.o!: o! 'the. <le tend.ante he.rou, and theu- l"eSfeo~ · 
· -J;'ive a;sent:s, attor:10jS, e~loyees, s,e...""VtUlts, tlt~ts, GUocesaori: : 
• or ·11.Ssio-:is be, :.,e1'!)et~ e~oi.'l&i irc;ic di.Te~t~ out~ thoir · ··; . t-
• • , • • • !. ••• 
re~eotive lauds aey ::iore wator tb.:m that al);t-o!"t:ionod to thee, · 
· ·au.a.be per:i,etu~ ·e~oitied .frora in ~ tncy'. int~foriAJ vi.1ib:the .. 
,: ·balazico ~t the ua:r· of sai~ at:::.-enn to .t~e la.:11is 01: tbo plaintllf. · . 1 ;' herein. 
3. Fo'r suob ·o:;her e.n.d turt~er relief 83 to 
seem ~ust ·a.:a ccr~ta.bio in bhe premise~, 
•t 
I.. 
·J 
.... ,. .  . 
' • ;"= • 
. : , \ 
~ 
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... ... -----------------
'• 
f 
' I 
; ! 
' 
.. 
. . 
~· . 
• S'l~ 0:5' U"'..JH , , ·~). 
i ea, 
·. CoWlt;r of aubon ) 
,.,,......, 
' 
Jal 
• I •: ...... 
. ~est i. Davis Jr. t b~. £i1'at clul;t, Bl10X'1l U.P,O:l oe.tb. .. 
: . dJ,?:poses · and. seys s .. 
'fha.t he is tile 1>1:u:ltii'f in tb.c, cb;,vo eu11i~lod action; 
~· ·, • tbs.ti he J:las ~o.d the abovo anc1 .tore~i:1.3 COJill:laint I¢ ~0\:3 tb,e , 
. . ,. . . . . . .. . . . . . 
· contents thereof', and' that the :t::!.llle 1a ti>ue ot· b:1s :o= .):D.onled;: t : · . . . . . . 
·: ·e~ceptin~ as to thoso 11:11tt~~ ~.t.::.:c:1.n .lttite4 ·o.i. info~cion ·ond 
. : : l>eliet, and as to those mattus, ho believes it to be t:rae:: 
: .· :~·< . .'e!' ~ t. » ~-. b : .:. .. . . . i'. i 
,,. • ' . ., •• , • , • i ••• JI 
. .. •,• . . . . . . . -~. . . :·· . { 
'i •' . _;._/ 
·· · ~- .. ·· .s~bsoribed IUl4 worn to betore ~et~~-:~~~:·.:-. : · .. ,· ,. 
. .:. :.' . '.:;?¢7 t ,A:D. , . 1957, . . . '.~··: .'' ·.:~~~:· ~ · :'/·; 
. ·.,. ..... : . . . . . ~-• . ~-~- ·r.::,. ~ ~·:.-. 
··.~ ~-: . :.·.·.·£;; ,4: 
' I> 
0 0 
• 
0 
:::::-;--- f .., t •• ~ • I 
·.c: - -
,,. . -- . 0 er:, •• , .. ' ' .. ' 
• o' I I, • I • • ' o ,• , ~ .. : • '";,'_,. -~, o ;i f • 
. : . : ;'.\i> ;-.,. ·•· · '· Re:1~4.inis p.t &1~~, Utah :t .· .'. ·,.~ · · · o- ': '· 
... • . . .• j 1 ,;- • • • .... , • 
.. . ~
,. 
·:: ·J!y OOlllmSsion. Ez;pir,es :~ .. .· .'. · ,':.. ~- · ,, -~ 
.·,~i~. ~;)95.9.; . · • -~'. .. · 
. . ' . ...~ 
: ' 
\ •, . 
.::·' 
I .. t 
t, ·~ \ . . 
. ' ·: ·. 
-=·· 
I:·. 
• • •• ~ t 
~-· 
I ~ .. • • 
· .. ., 
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Addendum 5 
Oross-Pla~ntif!, ) 
JR., and · 
) 
) 
COB -De£endantso) 
OCT 1 0 1957 
8 .. H. YOUNG, CL!aRK . 
av .. ~-~ .. ~
m,.'~u'fY/ / 
Civil Noo 7845 
EV00307 
000928 
-.!?l:~i~~2fi·),i ·:~, '. ;~~ii,..~~./'' ... : ((:;/\-t::~1--1,~ 
· .,· fd1i\ 't)hd'.J1tif:( to Ue'e~:~lla:ter :a:~~ 
,~,~~ ~~;n.~=-~J. t~~ 
'lii . . ·e'fflf has oeen any gre·at expenditure i1t,r ... ' 
~i~~-f~t· *~ ~~~ 
,. ) ·;ii11:1·f~allegationa of paragraph 9.. 'ii/ 
, .. . •',·"' !,,\'l:sc{ll~s of parag,aph 10, exeapt that thi!.. f J
f~,.{>p::iiatf £rr:Lf!;ti:l;ion. of plaintiff• s lands is beneficial.. t1 
~~? _~;~fi5f:?: :~ ~ ·~ · i( 
~e'.s;_Jlie al.:J.egations o.f :paragraph lL, Al.leges the fact ~ 
JjJi)~;a~cessors in interest of the plainti.f.f made a . · ... J 
~- ·.:;f·;~~Jo ~ 1~ · ~"'-- .. r:: 
if~Jt~{:1atio.n prior to 190;S o.r some of the waters of { 
'ci:;J!r~·ek with a point of. diversion a considerable distance t 
~JfC~:: ~ Jifi'.;~~e point of diversion which the plaintif'.£ is -~··. 
n,"ij.i31i.ve·ring to use. This defendant .further alleges that ~ 
'.r':F.,,~;ft"·. i+ = · 
N ·~ t'.~·;!i$.~1tf=~tf/1v.ersion or~~~';':~lly estabiished by a diligence f 
f;tz.litio1:i:~ihe.re is ana always has been considerably more water ~ 
:.1!:~~~rt:~'.o/..:ilf. g ·. r ti ;l~wtJtl~itat!: ot: springs t seeps' and othe:i:- sources of inflow i 
MJ1~t~~~!,k!!en available to the plaintif;(' and his predecessors t 
'~/ up'sl6i-:.c,dain point of diversion, wllich- plainti.ff now seeks to i~ 
~ ~~~·i?i:7 ,.i~, :> · i \;;f~{Jf!Wt~r& particu1ar1:r s~t forth in. the Affirmative m,:_:· 
''ses· •. { :tn turther a:o.swer to paragraph lJ., this de.fend ant denies ~ 
¥'iiJlftJ;,J1at ·;1~i~tiff or his predecessors have used water I 
":(y~'if::·~t,;~f·;~!,,~·;t-... t ·. ~i ~,.,.. : .. . t'! 
lrih'iil& ::-Maud· O~eek ior., 70 years t and alleges the fact to be i'i· 
Eiii,¥~.J;/riiht:·" initiated by plaintlhf.r or his predecessor 1l_ . i(( .:{~~}l\ .;tl\~~;" 1*::i - i<· .. , •. : ~ 
£nn:ifit:?,biuti~10x.<i:ek are junior to and inferior to the rights o!' u 
.{$l~t~~t~.i1tfi!~:1 · ,$. ~'t,~ • • ,. t 
:.~di3t:e:na'ttji.t·:.i I_: 
:' .. \\~*'}~'~TI}':-~ ,·, . ~ ,., ·. . ~ ,. ?:· . l 
·;ifJl.~l(,.~~:S, .. f-~e~ant admits,~hat~:for more than 70 years he and ii 
... .... . ;~~·;itrd·;:;i1;;::~,;v:·"';i;er;~·r:~titflf~;;· of Minnie Maud Oreek, and I 
.lit~ffifl~~Yi~ . ~-~( . r ... t: ? t 
·<' :,_.. t. ·.:i \\ ~-
EV00308 
000929 
I 
I. 
I 
! 
l 
i 
EV00309 
000930 
EV00310 
000931 
could not enlarge 
and diminish or limit the 
initiated, and that at said new 
priority is fixed as of the date the 
Third Affirmative Defense 
never recognized the right of the pla.intiff 
to move the point of diversion for plaintiff's 
change was made many ;rears ago, 
is not known to this defendant, this defen-
openly, notoriously, ad-
to divert the waters of 
on to their lands in the swne quantities as a.re 
has acquired 
the waters 
rig4ts 
acquired under the 
·1 t'hat 3l000, shares o"f stook 
• >_r. ".lt;': ••• • b.·r.h • •: " 
tr:i1l.;tltfui:~reterr e<L,,/t o dn 
-~i(t~~~J§;•'iifo~ ·~1,,): • " i._~,:. .. .,,: · 
£.~hd·irlH:t~'ii·6'rf-"-her~~'ed!&-c es sor11 
. ~,.~~;~:1~~~;~1·~ ·;61;_· _.: ,t_ .. ~ 
;lf'af.l~;,~i~if'bn "or~f~ right 
... ':fr ; ~· • 
. a . ~ ''mtge·ttt:·e right of this 
·~:~ .... ~,;,· . • ,,.:;~4-.f;~~;!~l:;-!-;::.·... ... .:~ 
. 
' 
EV00311 
000932 
f 
I 
EV00312 
000933 
. 
to cross-plaintiff'.s rights 0 
•··· 
I .. 
r 
~-
,. 
~ 
f. 
i 
EV00313 
000934 
KELLER 
~ .· .·' ' ·~~~ orneya 1~' Oross~Plaintiff, .A.nlber Keel 
. ?2 West Main · 
Price, Utah . 
mailed to plaintiff's attorney, Luke G. 
this)d_da.y of Octobe~, 
a 
1) 
1t.;\f 
;;j~: ;J!;,-r~ 
~;·q'{f!t 
,.: k'i'r-i·· 
, i~} 
Q):: _. 
~~l: 
%-- , 1;- .•: •• 
11;,; 
. ,;:~~. 
EV00314 
000935 
I-
i 
i 
I 
f 
i 
! j 
i 
l 
i 
i j 
l 
l 
J 
'.~i'"''l}J:~.~ 
: ~~ . ... -;~{ . ... • • ·: ~~. 4 •. ;ay.c? ~ !.~~1 _ ·· ... ; 
\ J-~ .G,.:t-,,• • \' :_ ,A;r.~,1~ / ,1, ,,; ~1~~,~-~~ .. ; ;')'"lj,, ... n:~~;;c" ... ;\y•.,,:f.tOi-,.'r.O:t 
,,·, 
. ,•;.;., ~,/Gi:imes, :now'' thl! ''de fondant T. F. Hounclcceper, and answers the 
iollows: 
l. 
paragra. ph 2 
A:dm~ta para.graph 
\)7jf iJ_:1/i'(·:: 4. _,._ Adm1ta paragraph 4 . 
lilf illl~fi!:~:~:::,:;dos o! ID,orpm<ion woru cxccu<ed, but allege, 
./': ·:1-·'.,'i:ii°.Ll th·c ·ArticTe11 provided that they would not become opcxative unlcu s and ~-p-
·t\kf{/;:J:{), :·, .. · . ,'-} :. _.:-. ,, ., .. .. : ; 
i. :.'..": :.~',}t~'::3,; . .000 shar,es·-.01 s·tock HhaU nave be en 11 ubocribed. That 3, ~00 shares were · 
··.: :\~.~:.}~';"::.,:.:~:~r/.:;·/·~~:;J, .. :;_":: · ~ :,, . ..... . .. ;t,--;•.1,:- . . .-Ji:. ~ 
;'.'.·,\1-f-~·c;;,~~-j\;o~cribcii; : ci~d that tne :1°brp;oi°"a. tiou h.aa not func tioncd n.s such, Den1~e'·· 
~',ftt\St~ir.ftt~:tf::-- .]./:.:-:/·: >, :·,·: --'i';./)t~-~~5-0 '.: .. 
':°•'".r?},;;tlfo~·r ;_cm';dniiig :allcga'tfonfl° of;pa'l'iig'raph· 7. 
Z{P:ili;~{\1.:~r?~·/FJ .. /:···~ .. r~{~.:~:t~\:::.·~~/J/~\- ·tf ?.):1~fr:i~~irt~?rt- -?; . ._ • 
~:,:.-1-:/·/\·),;;.:::1-.:i,:'::-,::_t.8.· :Dcrii'cs ,paragr·apli:·.8,;·::cxcept-.that he aclmits that Articl'ci'.o! Incorpo-
.. ~~";t~~~;.;:·:~~t~~::;::;~;~·i:'f:;.;,::j;>~· ·_. ·;·-~\ ··::~~,-~:::::_:-,;~':::· .. ·., :~~_-..  r~&~;:;.(~~:~/:~·~::t:.-,,:. ;-\··--· ~'.:.;\.{~r ;r.::. .. ~:-~,.t<1~ .. ,.-;~\,~~:-~~\~7\ .... ,. _  
;-'i{"? ,t'.;- :·, 1:.-:i_--.~r .a _ti'on ,.y..-er·e signc d ;_. cont.,.·iriiiig<tlio'ilmnta:t1on,a 'lfov·e·.-m-en tione·a. ·::uffp:i:ra'g:ra.ph 7 
a tWtf f }};~-\ /'_. :_\ :·: . ; -·. <.:;r= 'i"_} }'':. (;~~\\U~}/~~:;i).:-:~ :C1:);~/\/r·? {-,,P.-._;i.;,,,'.-fJ,~,;:J18}:11~- ~. -... i 
·.-;:,_::.- .~;:._-:, ... : ;:::-·of 'tl:i:i's answer,· and :th·a t ·eha:rcs :-ofr stcic:k:wcr'e'.'°8UbBcribed':iri, th e7am·oUn1: sot ' 
W0i\1f, ' '\ft ;:r-,~'.~p.h • ."'. ;h'c~~J,;ili1JJI·t:f ,~ttitL . .:. :t~::;;:~ :~ 
: '·'.'.-:'..</ ... .._. _9; Admito ' tha.t 1tTii -b'c'ir_ii_fic·~a1)·or)p'ia1nti.H-·.fo '. u:ii''c~\;,at·;;;-r::an/piaintiI£'11 
~i:··=.;·t··:={~ :.:· ., . -'::..... . I : · •• :;i,~ .. ::.,_=.J.. :;.: ... · . .. ·:. ·:~:,Y:·~(~l:):;:·:tt{f?iJ:;::q·~·~10,~1\1!;};.;:rt~,:;:':~?·:,':,.,£(t ::!;::).: !::;:4t"-~.-~t·.?i. 
,7:;;t)/{/.'. ;and·,: 'Dcni'd tli:it , thc'i C"' h~s ib·Jl!·j'i'.~n:ny.f.g-r;bit':c1iM'xiilifilt:!'./Jiih'li~~i;y\(.';:;iJ · denic u 
;t:~~.:·~~-t~: ··:. · ·' .-:"~·:~. (:,.~4_)· ;: ,·· .r..r~.-J;:;{/{~:.:_r;2~::):~b}ffS;-~~1-~i~;:~}Ifitrfi~{J1:.~:?I~\.'.f!\:/f:· _: 
001317 
the point of diversion 
to use. This defendant further 
originally established by a diligence 
ha:; been considerably more water available 
of inflow than i s or has been 
is more particularly set forth in 
Defenses, In further answer to paragraph 11, this defendant 
::jfJ:i~;iti~:ciiically that plaintiff or his predecessors have used water from 
~;f;:-~r1:?i t . :·:: ..-:· .. 
..• ,.,_!.-Minnic ··Maucl.Creek for ?0 years, and alleges the iact .to be that all water rights 
1tr~.~~:r~~:J\ 
.. , ..• . . -~~_:tl.\,'.fuifuted by plaintiff or his predecessor in Minnie Maud Creek are junior to 
'.;;~:.'.t:~[~r~ '.'.·:> .. 
·,:,':/:'!,:}_:;f~:a'lld .inferior to the rights of this defendant, 
'l\l:,: ., 12. Thi, dofondant admits that for more than 70 years he and hi, 
,-.-,::.::-.,.,prc·decessora have diverted the waters of Minnie Maud Creek, and as they now 
v.~i~J~twtt1J&i .-:/ --.·. 
r·' 'f·····-c~:t:,,,.,,~,;\,,, divert and use said waters, and this defendant admits that he claims the right 
r;}~f@titf~t~;M .. : . -· 
1!t{;.~?~f)f:ft.! fo : so utilize the .waters of Minnie Maud Creek. 
ti,il,;~l!f I~ii ~re ,uff:::en::::::h::::b::r:::::::~,:~: ~::::: :::::::,:e:: :::::. 
'· .. t·"·,·i~-.1 •• , ... ,.~lj,•,.0 • ..... . . . . ,·. - ., pri.ated prior to 1903, and further alleges that at the point of diversion initiated 
:::tl'-~1\::;::r; .... }.:·:~n-. .c.:~:.~~-:5;;. _:"-:?:,:·: : 
il;;ft~i:{~)t\k <·.=/( ·- ··:. · .  f by ,the plaintiff and his predecessors there is water available in the stream, 
...... ,.'i\_ ·.~·.i-;t4:.r ... . (' \:(~{;lff1lV ·. ·:: and th.at had plaintiff and his predecessors continued to use said point of diver-
:. <~:-){=tj:l oi.oiL t~el'e wolild have.beer!. amule water to fill their a.porou.riation under their 
001318 
&i,i~i~~1.~;r;1:1l~1~;rf iititrrtt !I J!it1&f ~ii[tf ti 
d'ge)i'~tlia.".t~t:Ji'e·.:tli'ingit i ¾l::,'i{ouifiii(diversion was made without the filing · ~·i 
\:<itltit~~f!Jf}?!~}i)fff;·u?? i\ \?\:? ::1' ~ ! 
,,\C!iahg'e) a:p_plicationdn·:the '~Ofiic'·e<;of the State Engineer I as is and was re- ; ; 
~*tj.~tW-J~:;:;':/:_~--·--~_::,'f:;·/,:--·;·>.:';?'::·':);'Y::· :'. 
Mffe. .. 9.t.:\?iJ',:,:!i'!.J?:~t .~~.~.d ,c~ .~ge m point of diversion did not interfere with ., 
~:f.~~l~'f1{i.'.'*~\(./ .. ~:·· :·.:,.·:/. ~ :.; ·: .·.:,:_ ~· ·_: 
~~ ·1:b·r / rlghts··:ofit11i's· :acfori:dant b ecause the ne w point of diversion i!; also 
.f ~1t~?.r:f ;r:1t·: i::\);r~:~. ~ ·: :·> : '. · · · · 
vroii'tr.eam.:· from., this 'defondant, and this'defendant has continued to USC the )~f]tt};,,.::.,:jJ~}:. . . 
·ter:(ap'prop:da.ted by him a nd by his predecessors, without regard to the 
point of diversion by the plaintiff. 
the allcr,ations o.f paragraph 15. 
f( :'·:<.Dcnic ~ each and every allegation in the complaint not herein cx-
~?Jif~~·hriam'itted, it~Jg:,;~~/ ;y way oi fu,thor answer and affirreative defense, thls defondant 
:-JJ::;;r:{.lchnits, denies and a 11,.,ge5 as follows: 
First Affirmative Defense 
l. Thac when plaintiff's predecessors in interest initiated a diligence 
utilize water from Minnie Maud Creek and at the subsequent tune when 
~;i; ,,;,:,-,.:,,:, .··.,~·'.,i'-·,f.--' the .Articles of Incorporation which are attached to plaintiff's complaint were 
1iR!~~::,~~J~~~~ .~~r\~~·r.~r-~); :·· .. . 
1\?/f;.t;,,.<}'.) .,~~xccuted, plaintiff' fl predecessor in interest used a point of diversion down-
/ftji!li1JI}'.'f ~\! t,eam :~o:h~: ,:::• ao:,ili~:::::n .::::::::~:,::: ~=;e •::::· Creek 
t ,'if.,f:}ff- .\.''.'.-: .. :· .. ·./:/above this origin.al point of diversion for the plaintiff' s right, which sour ces of 
t'f-~ltl r '.: ('.' ····· r:::: :::":.::::::::::::::~:~::=~·::: ~~~: :.·o:~,~: :: ::e:~i.~n 
001319 
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at his now claimed 
years of adverse , open and 
rights have been acquired under 
defendant. 
of the fact that 3, 000 shares of stock have never been 
predecessors has ever recognized the validity of said corpora-
to exercise any corpoi·ate powers . That the diligence right of 
is prior in time to any o! the rights of the plaintiff. That this 
s ucc e6sor in interest to the r i ghts of T . F, Housekeeper, which 
to the rights of the plaintiff. That if the rights of 
1:ver been prior to or superior to the rights of this deiendant 
defendant denies) then nevertheless this defendant has for more 
using without regard to the rights of the plaintiff, and under 
supcriol· in priority to the rights oi the plaintiff, and 
is entitled to continue to :;o use the water under the doctrine of 
U!.le, 
WHEREFORE, thio defendant prays that the court proceed to adjudge 
the respective 1:ights of the parties, their points of divers ion, prior-
cllite"!I, and all other elemcnt:J of their water rights. This defendant iurthcr 
;:pray11 that th<: court adjudge and decree that the rights of the plaintiff arc junior 
'.:an·d inferior to the rights of this defendant; that the rights of plaintiff were at 
least originally for a point of diversion down11tream from that prcacntly cla.imod 
001321 
~::~:~,; :··--. 
·l e ;a: t .. 
;i~t i tfflJ!\~,i~r ?"f ?t~lf ~1,1~" ,; .... , ; 
, ·, a.1vci·s 10n ;-. tnat .th'e . cou:r:t adJU:d'ge '.; ~,,: ,-~:-:·,:·: ,; ', 7.'.\ ,. ;4«' 
... .,.,.~,;1,};,;.~'.; .  ~;;.;::'.:<· .. ; ..,,;, '..:. .. · ...... -: :;:·:· .. ··.·: <·:·.: · .. ~:-_·/ ·.J·_ ~- :.,~ /.:_'~,§d~1:t 
_,t',£r~j:by{tlris_;/c1cfenchi'n't ha 5 'been arid is l awful"; :_.,:" .. ·. . ::·:>·::··· r~:":.i:: 
;~~·)r=t}.f~::~:·:t::·-.~~-.. :·-;. .. : ·~:·.=. :· -~~~; ·._ · ;-? ·: · .... 
>, .[P 1iS.:}itidifti'rtrie / ·'rc\ie£ as appears just and cq~itaoie: ::':···, ): 
~T~~:@~?~~f ·{Y:~f?}):;::·:::~: ~~ ~~~{~~:(· ~ ~· ~. . };: : I •• •• -~ .. :: • • • ; 
·si'l!,Yf:1G-ti:i:~f~til'1i:c· .. c·1t r·t·a-i,ai:d to tnis aetendant his cos ts incurred .: ,. . .:~· 
......... 
CLYDE &: MECHAM 
-~' " 
.: (i . \ ) ) /--1.\ tl,Y.~-) , •. - , ., ;-;-; .... A ~· ..,: · f _ ..... ~. ~-c ___ .. 
cys for Dcfen'da.nt T. FV 
Housekeeper 
th Seate Stn~ct 
ity, U~\h 
~)iif.~ti:~~b ~{;, of tho foregoing mailo d to plaintiff'" attorney, Luke G, Pappa,, 
:~~i.{J::·,,:~lrJ :',East'·.Main Street, Price, Utah, thi,; ,2:2_, day oi May, 1957. 
/ (i)' _.: ;} ) J .. ~-:6./ r/ - .-
)/t JI.I,,; .. ,,( (.( .,,._,l. -·- J~ . 
\ ------.::::=...- -
",: . . -:'. ·. ~ .. ·; .. .... • ' 
. ·: . -~·! 
·i 
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Addendum 6 
IN THE FOURTH JUDIC:t,.L DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR TBE 
COµNi'Y OF DUCHESNE, STATE OP' UTAH 
It.T 'l'BE MA'I'TER OF 'l'HE GENERAL 
DETERMINATION O.F RIGHTS TO THE .fss.~ ©.:' .:\ 
USE Oli' ALl, WATER, BOTH SURFACE 
AND UNDERGROUND, WI'I!HDl THE 
DRAINAGE ARBA OF 'l'RE UIN'l'AB 
BASIN AND LOWER GREEN RIVER 
BASIN IN .UTAH. 
CODE NO. 47 
OBJEC'l'ION AND PROTEST Tffi PROPOSED DE'JJERMINATION 
MADE F.i' STA'fE ENGINEER 
* * 
LOOJ:S MOTTE objects .to the proposed dete:cmination made by 
the State Engineer of the state of utah in the above matter as the 
same relates to his water rights an, water users claims in the Nine 
Mile area and alleges as follows: 
l. Objects to the denial. of water users Claims# 128 and 129 
and any other Water Users claims on ·which an adverse report and deter-
mination was made by the State Engil'.leer .filed by Louis Motte which is 
for irrigation water and stock water as aQ inci~eµta.l use for land on 
Minnie Maud creek on the following 1rounds: 
(a) 1'bat said water rights are not owned by the Minnie 
Maus Irrigation company as stated 41. the state Engineer's report. 
(b) That said water rights are owned by Louie Motte by 
reason of use of said waters for irrigation purposes and stock water-
ing purposes upon the land set fortb in said Water users claims prior 
to 1903 and the use continuously thereof to date, and the right to 
the use of said water is under what is commonly referred to as a 
Diligence Claim. 
(c) That said water rights are now owned by Louis Motte 
by reason of adverse use 0£ said water right set forth in said Water 
Users Claim ~y the open, notorious and continuous use of said water 
on said lands prior to 1937. 
(d) That the Minnie ~ud Irrigation company never did 
acquire the said water righter thah the same was never transferred to 
the M:l.nnia Maud I~riqation COI!\PanY and the irri!Jj'i~~oE~ was not 
IN lllE DISTRICl' coiiif DUafSlf C:tlJNW, sm,. Q.t 111AII 
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legally organized and ha~ not at any time, during its claimed existence, 
contrplled and distributed the water rights on Nine Mile creek and 
particularly the water rights of the petitioner herein. 
DATED this 1st day of October, 1964. 
STATE OF UTAH ) iaa. 
CO"CJN'fi OF CARBON) 
F$.NDSEN AND KELLER 
a~f2:t!A,~J 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
Professional Building 
·Price, Utah 
DUANE A. FRANDSEN being duly sworn upon oath deposes and 
says: 
That be is one of the attsrneys for the petitioner in the 
above petition7 that he has read the same and knows the contents thereof 
and the same is true and correct to the best of his knowledge and 
information, except as to matters thc:!rein stated upon information and 
belief, and as to those matters be l:>(llieves it to be true, that he 
makes this verification on behalf of: the petitioner for the reason 
that he is out of the city and not available to sign this verification 
for himself. 
Subscribed and sworn 
1964. 
My Commission Expires: 
2/4/66 
to befpre me this 1st day of October, 
;/}-;t~v ~. ~~ 
Notary PUblic 
Residing at Price, Utah 
on this 2nd day of October, 1964, I mailed a copy of the 
foregoing O~jection and Protest to ~he following: Mr. Wayne D. 
Criddle, State Engineer, State ca.piool, Salt Lake City, utah. 
-~~ 
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IN mE FOUR'l'li JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF DUCHESNE, SV.'?E OF UTAH 
IN 'l'BE MA'l"l'ER OF 'l'HE GJmERAL 
DP:'l'BBMINA'l'ION OF .RJ'.GB'l'S 'l'O THE 
USE Oi' ALL WATER, l!OTB smu'~CE 
Am> mmERGROUND, WITHIN~ 
DRA:nmGE ARFA OF 'l'HE UDITAH 
BASnT AND LOWER GREEN RJ:VER 
BASIS' IN 'UTAH. 
( 
)) 
( 
) 
( CODE NO. 47 
AMENDED OBJli:Clt'ION ANp PRO'lES'l' 'l'O 
PROPOSED DETERMINATIO!l MADE BY STATE ESGIHEER 
* • 'Ir 
... , '"' j, 
Petitioner, LOUIS MO'l"l'E, am~nds his prior objection and 
protest .to proposed determination made by the State Engineer dated 
October 1, 1964, by adding the follo~ing furthex o~jection as para-
graphs :ff,2 and 3. h 
2. 'l'h.e state Engineer, in his proposed d~ination of water 
rights, failed to include the fol~o~ng springs o6d by petitioner, 
D:>uis Motte, which springs are used for stock wat~ing purposes and 
have been so used since prior to l90B and continU?W3lY since that 
time up to the present time. Said springs and th,flt :-forty a.ore tract 
of land on which they are located ar.e as follows :f 
(1) An unnamed apring Bast of Slaugluler Pen spring 
located in the Northe2l.Bt Quarter of southwest Quarter of section 4, 
TOWnship 12 South, Range l2 ·East, wq'd,~h flows 0.10 cfs. 
(2) AI1 unnamed spring West of Slaughter Pen Spring 
located in the Northeast Quarter of .southwest Quarter of section 4, 
Township 12 south, Range 12 East, wlµ.ch flows 0,10 cfs. 
3. On claim #132 reported at Page 89 of the Blue Book of 
porposed water determination by the State Engineer, said report . shows 
said claim #132 owned by Louis Mott~ as the owner of Diligent spring 
flowing O.ll cfs of water in the No~thwest Quarter of Southeast ouart~, 
of section 13, Township 12 south, Rli\1198 12 East, and the flow of said 
spring should be 0.25 ofa. 
DA'l'ED this 4th day of Nove~ber, 1964. 
20215 
FBANDSEN AND lQ!:LLBR 
BY.~ ~~/ e<c,,,, 
Attorneys for Patitioner 
Professional Building 
~dt1e, Utah 
HT000063 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
:as. 
COUNTY OF CARBON} 
DUANE A. FRANDSEN being duly sworn upon oath deposes~ 
says: 
That he is one of the atto~neys for the petitioner i n 
above petition; that he has read the same and knows the conten· ::. ··.1·: 
and the same is true and correct to the best of his knowledge 
information, except as to matters therei n stated upon info:r:mat ,. 
belief, and as to those matters he believes it to be true; tba 
makes this verification on behalf o~ the petitioner for the ra 
that he is out ·of the City and not available to sigh this ver! ··• 
for himself. 
and sworn to before me this 4th day of NQ 
NcftaryPublic 
Residing at Price, Utah 
Expires: 
-7:\J, . . . ' ~ 
· -; ·.'·.L, / On this 4th day of November, 1964, I mailed a copy of the 
:tfu:~:~ing objection and Protest to the following: Mr. Wayne D. 
Criddle, state Engineer, State capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF DUCHESNE, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OP THE GENE.BAL 
DETERMINATION OF RIGHTS TO THE 
USE OF ALL WATER, BOTH SURFACE 
Alm UNDERGROUND, WITHIN THE 
DR1\INAGE AREA OF Tm;l UINT}Mi 
BASIN AND LOWER GREEN RIVER 
BASIN IN UTAH. CODE NO, 47 
, 
OBJECTION AND PROTEST TO PROPOSED DE~ERMI~Jl\TI9N 
MADE BY STATE ENGINEER 
* ·It * 
AMBER I<EEL objects to the proposed determination made by the 
state Engineer of tne state of Utah in the above matter a13 tbe same 
relates to her water rights and water users claims in the Nine Mile 
area and alleges as follows: 
1. Objects to the denial of Water Users Claims 4t 130 and 164 
and any other Water Users Claims on which an adverse report and deter-
mination was :made by the state Engineer filed by Amber ICeel. whicll is 
for irrigation water and stock water as an incidental use; for land on 
Minnie Maud creek on the following grounds: · 
· (a) .That said water rights are not owned by, the Minnie 
Maud Irrigation company as stated in the state Engineer'~ report. 
(b) That said water rights are owned by Amber Keel by 
reason of use of said waters for irrlgation purposes and stoolt watering 
purposes upon the land set forth i11 .said water users cla:l,ms prior to 
1903 and the use continuously thereof to date, and the right to the use 
of said water is under what is commonly referred to as a Diligence claim 
(c) That said water rights are now owned by Amber Keel 
by reason of adverse use of said water right set forth in sa·id water 
users Claim by the open, notorious and continuous use of Sqid water 
on said lands prior to 1937. 
/, 
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(d) That the Minnie Mauq Irrigation Company never did 
ac<;1uire the said water righta7 that the same was never transferred to 
the Minnie Maud Irrigation Company and the urigation company was not 
legally organized and has not at any time, during its claimed existence, 
controlled and distributed the water rights on Nine Mile Creek af?-d 
particularlr the water rights of the petitioner herein . 
2. Object to the denial of w~ter users claim #23 filed by 
petitioner Amber Keel on an unnamed spring under application #6563 and 
certificate· of Appropriation #689 in ~he Utah State Engineer's office, 
which is shown in the state Engi neer's report as o~med by A. z. Thompson, 
and that said right is covered by Water users claim# 1093 by the 
Bureau of Land Manage!'lent. This spring, used for stock wate:i:;ing pur-
poses, is owned by petitioner Amber K~el and she received a conveyance 
of said water right from her father, It. z . Thompson, many years pr ior 
hereto and that . a ·deed of said water Eight was recorded in the Duchesne 
County Recorder ' s Office in Book 20 of needs, at Pages 92 and 93. '.I'he 
water from said spring · has been used eontinuously since the date of 
appllcation by petitioner and her pre4ecessors in interest to water 
livestock and the spring is 1ocated on patitioner's Bureau of Land 
Management's allottment from the Bure~u of Land Management, 
DATED this 1st day of Octobe~, 1964. 
STATE OF UTAH l 
•BS . COUNTY OF CARB0N) 
FRANDSEN AND KELLER . 
~y i'!fZ .. t!(;tifi;:<--··z,.L ea,,J. 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
Professional Building 
Price, Utah 
DOA~ A. FRANDSEN being duly sworn upon oath deposes and 
says, 
That he is one of the attorn~ya for the petitioner in the 
above petition; that he has read the $arne and knows the contents thereof 
and the same is true and correct to the best of his knowledge and 
information; except as to matters t herein stated upon information and 
belief, al'l.d as to those matuers he be~ieves it to be tzue; that he 
makes this verification on behalf of ~he petitioner for the reason· 
that she is out of the city and not available to sign this verifi-
cation f9r hersel f . 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 1st day of October, 
1964. 
My Commission Expir~s: 
2/4/66 
WRAdj 0147 
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on this 2nd day of October, 1964, I mailed a. copy of the 
foregoing Objection and Protest to tqe following: Mr . Wayne D. 
Criddle, State Enginee~, State capit~1, S~lt Lake City, utah. 
WRAdj 0148 
001058 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT CIYURT, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF DUCHESNE, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE GENERAL 
DETERMINATION OF RIGHTS TO THE 
,USE OF ALL WATER, BOTH SURFACE 
AND UNDERGROUND, W:CTHIN THE 
DRAINAGE AREA OF .THE UINTAH 
BASIN AND LOWER GREEN RIVER 
BASIN IN UTAH. CODE NO. 47 
OBJECTION AND PROTEST TO , PROPOSED DETERMINATION 
MADE BY STATE ENGINEER 
* II: 
BERNARD IRIART, ALBERT THAYN and WILLIAM c. DAUSE object to 
the proposed determination made py the State Engineer of the State of 
Utah in the above matter as the same relates to their water rights . 
and water users claims in the Nine M;l.le area and allege as follows: 
1. Object to the denial of water users Claims# 368 and 369 
filecl by Bernarcl Iriart which is for irrigation water for land on 
.Minnie Maod Creelc on the following grounds: 
(a) That saicl wate;i: rights are not o~med by the Minnie 
Maud Irrigation Company as stated i~the state Engineer's report. 
(b) o;rhat said water rights were formerly owned by 
Bernard Iriart and are now owned by Albert Thayn and William c. Dause 
by reason of use of said waters for irrigation purposes upon t11e land 
set forth i.n said Water Users Claims• prior to 1903 and the use continu-
ourly thereof to date, and the righ~ to the use of said water is undex 
what is commonly referred to as a Diligence claim. 
(c) That said W/i.ter r.i\ght is now owned by Albert Thayn 
and William c. Dause as the successors of Bernard Iriart by reason of 
adverse use of said water right set forth in said water Users Claims, l 
the open, n~torious and continuous use of said water on said lands 
prior to 1937. 
01.-
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{d) That the Minnie Maud Irrigation company never did 
acquire the said wc1ter right1 that the same was never trc1I1aferred to the 
M1nnie Maud Irrigation Company e.nd the irrigation company was not 
legally organized and baa not at any -ti1ne, during its claimed existence, 
controlled. ancl distributed the water l:lighta on Wine Mile creek and 
particularly the water rights of the Betitioners herein. 
2. The sta'te Eng:i.neer, in his proposed detez;mination of water 
rights, failed to inclucle the followia,g springs which were formerly 
owned by Bernard lriart and are now o$ed by Albert Whayn and William 
c. Dause as his successors in intereau, and _which springs are used 
for stock watering purposes and have been so used since prior to 1903 
and continuously since that time up td the present date. Said springs 
and the forty acre tract of land on '?liich ·they are located are as 
follows: 
(1) An unnamed spring lqcated at the mouth of Minnie 
Maude Canyon in the NE¼ :sE\ of Sec, 18, Twp. 12 s, 
Range 13 East. 
{2) An unnamed spring lqcated at the forks of Jim's 
Canyon in SE¼ sw~ of sed. 22, Twp. 12 south, Range 
13 East. · 
(3) An unnamed spring on the East side of Shelby 
ThoJl\Pson's cabin ~cwa e2) in the NW¼ NW¼ of 
Seo. 25, Twp. 12 East, ~ange 12 south. 
(4) An unnamed spring lqoated at the point of Myron's 
Ridge in the NE\ sw¼ of Seo. 30, TWp, 12 South, Range 
13 East. 
(5) An unnamed spring oq t11e East side of Pole canyon 
Riage in the SW¼ SW¼ of'Sec. 30, Twp. 12 South, Range 
13 East. 
(6)An unnamed d~rge spr~ng on the lower center of 
Pole canyon Rid.ge in th~ SW~ NE¼ of Sec. 25, Twp. 12 
south, Range 12 East, 
(7) An unnamed spring wl!,ich is the lower spring at 
the West face of Haysta~k Pinnacles in the SE¼ SW~ 
of Sec. 19, Twp. 12 south, Range 13 East. 
(B) An unnamed spring lecated on a brancl1 or Pole canyon 
l:>elow Thayn' s cabin in i:he swi4 sw\ of sec. 31, Twp. 12 
South, Range 13 East. 
{9) An unnamed spring lq,oated on the branch of the left 
fork of Pole canyon in the NW¼ NE/.,i of Seo. 31, Twp. 12 
South, Range 13 East. 
{10) Pine Spring, which is located at the North end 
of Long Hollow in them.¼ SE¼ of Seo. 18, Twp. 12 
south, Range 13 East, · 
(ll)An unnamed. spring which is the upper spring at the 
base of Haystaclc Pinnacie in the N.E¼ sw;l.,, of sec. 20, 
Twp. 12 South, Range l3'Bast. 
{·12) An unnamed spring ~t Lewery' s Cabin in Spring 
Canyon in the NW¼ NE¼ of sec. 29, Twp. 12 South, Range 
13 Bast. 
(13) An unnamed spring. located on a branch off the right 
fork of Jim's canyon in the SW~ SW¼ of sec. 22, Twp. 12 
South, Range 13 East. 
(14) An unnamed apring ~n the right fork of Jirn'a Canyon 
in the NW~ SE¼ of Seo. 28, Twp. 12 South, Range 13 East. 
-2-
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That these fourteen springs ~re all located in Nine Mile 
within the Green River draim1ge and w.1(thin the area which -!:he Court 
is m..aking a determination of the wate~ rights and should be included 
in the final court Order making such qetermination. 
DATED this 1st day of Octobe~, 1964. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF CARBON) 8 ~· 
FRANDSl!lN AND I~LLER 
BY f;t:a~kd 
Attorneys orthesePetitioners 
Professional Building 
Price, Utah 
DU1\NE A, FRANDSEN being duly -sworn upon oath deposes and 
says: 
That he is one of the attorn~ys fof the petitioners in the 
above petition; that he has read the $Jame and knows the contents thereof 
and the same is true and correct to the best of his Jcnowledge and 
information; e)mept:1as to matters thefein stated upon information and 
belief, and as to those matters he he~ieves it to be true; that he 
rnaJce·s this verification on behalf of the petitioners for the reason 
that they are out of the City and not available to sign this verifi-
cation for themselves. 
subscribed and sworn to befdre me this 1st day of October, 
1964. 
My Commission Expires: 
2/4/66 
On this 2nd d.ay of October, 1964, I mailed a copy of the 
foregoing Objection and Protest to tl,e f0llowing: .Mr. Wayne n. 
Criddle, State Engtneer, State capit~l, Salt Lake city, U'tah . 
. ~a-< ~4 e < Secretary 
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rn THE Dl:S'ra.IC'P COUUT 9J!' TllE FOURTH JODICllL DJ:ST.1ICT, L'1 ,.AND FOil. 
DUCHESNE ·COUNTY, ST.iTE OF UTAH 
D! TllE )IATTER OF THE GEliERA.L 
DETEruilN.\.TION OF THE WATEil 
:;uGilTS TO THE USE OF lf4,TER BOTH 
SWP'.ACE AND UNDERGROUHD A.ND 
WI.THIN THE DR.ADU.GE AREA OF THE 
UINT~ BA.SIN IN UTAH. 
OBJECTION TO THE PROPOSIDD DETI!:RHINiTION 
OP' THE W.A.TER RIGHTS OF THE STATE ENIGNEER, 
~INE HILE CREEK DIVISIOll CODE 4?, 
l, Co111e s now Clive Spro\\B e and Myrtle Hae Spr~11Be , husband 
and wife, and Willis Ha.=ersruidt and Wilma Hammerel!lidt, hueband and 
wif'e, and ~ile thiB their objection to the proposed deter111ination 
o:f t:q_~ir water rights in the Uintah 3sBin Nine Hile Creek Division, 
Code 47, Township 11 South, S.L.E,M, to TownsW.p 12 So\,th, S,L,B.H. 
Central Unit, Theee ob.jeotors allege tbat Clive Sprouee and ,~yrtl.e 
!•i:ae Sp1•ouse, husband and rlfe, a.rJ the ownere of the :following de~-
cribed real. property situated in carbon Co,wty, State o:f Utah, and 
that they are selling the said l.and \.mder contract ' to · 1fillis 
:.:Ja:nmerentldt and Vilma llarnmersmidt, husband l!l.Ild 1'1if'e, together with 
the water rights thereunto belonging including irrigation, domestic, 
cul.linary and etock ,tatering belonging to tlle said land, that the 
eaid land is described as fol.lows; 
The weet half of the north1,est quarter of Section 
14, To,mship l.2 South, ~ange l) East, of' the Sa.1 t 
Lake Meridil!.ll., 
llao, the northeast qua.rter; the eaet half of the 
northwest quarter of Section 15, Township l.2 South, 
ne.nge lj East of the Salt Lalte Meridian, lase 
piece to ~mber Xeel . 
2. That these objeotora ·ar• informed and believe and so 
all:egee that their predeoeseorzi in intereet acc;,\tired water rights 
for irrigation, domestic, oullinary and stock watering trom lli.nnie 
1,:11.ud Creelc: by going upon the said land and divertit'lg th11 water f'rou1 
the }!innie lraud Creu1 and conveyi.ug t!1e eame in ditches to the said 
land iu 1385 and using the said water thereon tor irrigation, domestic 
00084. 
1i1 :C L E D 
IN THE DISTRICT cowrr 
»IJC!lfSNf COONTY, STAlf OF UTAH 
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culli.nary and stock watering 1n1rposes. Th11,t the said water has been 
used oontinously without interruption since the said time upon the 
~aid la.i1ds and that there are 55, 10 ac1·es or m~re under irriga.tio:1 
and stock watering ~or 150 cattle and lf horses, 
J, That the State Engineer by the proposed de~ermination 
a£ water right11 froa1 the :i.annie l•laud Creek has set forth in said 
proposed determin!!!,t:l..on on file herein, under claill1s number11 188 
and 189 on page 106 of said proposed determination, proposes that 
the court adjudicate the water belonging to the said lands of thel!le 
objectors, by adjudicating the right 0£ use of the said waters to 
the I1innie }!aud Irrigation Co1,tpany, These objeotor11 obj eat that 
.their water rights to 1:1.Il.d fo1• the said land being aesigned, transfei"Ted 
or set over to, or the right to distribute given, turned or adjudicated 
to the 1'1innie Maud Irrigation Company. For the reaso,, that the water 
rights to the said land belonging to these objectors, and not to the 
Hinnie Uaud Irrigation Company, The Hinnie Maud Irrige.t1on Company 
does not own the· said water rights to the said land, or it is entitled 
to any right, title or interest in or to the said water rights used 
upon 01.• belonging to the said land, Thnt the :1-1.iruu.e Haud Irrigation 
Company is defunct and non-exie·tant i and hae been for ninny )'ears 
last past, That these objectors are inf'orrued and believe and so 
f!lllege that the said Minnie I,Ia1.1d J:i.•riga.tion Company has failed to 
oarry,...eut t~e purposes it is purported to have been organized for, 
Th.at it has not distributed the water of' these objectors, or to 1ts 
stodkholders, and tllAt these objectors a.re i.ni'ormed and believe and 
I 
ab allege that it did no ·t distribute the water to their predecessors 
in interest, That it bas not built, or maintained dams, canals or 
ditches to co11vey and distribute the water from the Z.1.1.nn.ie Uaud 
Creek·, That it ha!!! not levied assess111ents or e:teroil!led jurisdiction 
or control 1.mde:x- the said waters of' the t.rinnie Maud Creel, for a long 
period of years, if at all, That the water belonging to.tne · said 
land of these objectors hae been diverted by them or their predeoessorl!I 
HT000066 
001063 
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in i11terest fror.i its natural oha.nnel to theii· said la.i.1ds by , daUJs and 
tli tches bolonging to the:,e objecto1.·s and their predecessors in .inter-
est, and that said water has been used by them a11d their predeoesi,ors 
u11der claim of right upo11 their lands :tor a long period of' time, 
4, That a.s a further objecUon these objectors alle~e that 
the Hi1mie )laud Irrigat:l.oo Compally ha.5 no r:Lght, title or intere11t 
in 01.• to the said water rights used upon the l.and.11 of these objectors, 
That it has no valid conveyance to the water of' theea objectors 
lnnd, nor does it have a right to control or supervise its use, or 
make distribution or to e::i:eroise auy a11thority over its u!le, 
5, Tha.t as a further and separate objection these 
objectoi•s allege that if' l!laid Minnie Haud Irrigation Company ever 
had, or acquired any right, t:ltle or interest i11 or to the water 
rishts used upon tlle said lands of thees objectors, that the eame 
has been lost, tl1rough adverse, t'U5e of these objecto1.•s and their 
predecessors in intore,et, That these ohjectors have used the gaid 
,, ater for irrigat~. on, oullinary, domes';ic and stool: watering purposes 
,uider cla.i1:i of right and t:!. tle, oontin .. •.onsly n.nd I'd thout :!.11terruption 
:from the 1-!inn.ie ~lal.j.d Irr:l.ga tion Coopan~• or a.n1•one else, a.1noo the 
3•ear 1918 and prior thereto, and that the said nse uas opened 
notorious and l1os.tile and adverse to t:ie i·iahts of the l•!innie Ua,,d 
Irriaation Company a.11d all othere' alld to the wholo world. 
lllfilP.;!:J!'Or.E, these objectors pi•ay that the court find, 
dec1.•ee and adjudge that the waters and ,,rater rights bel.ougi11g to 
the ·said land herein described in the :J.!:101mt of' 55, 10 aoras or :t,ore, 
to.:;:et:!ie:1: with the stock ,rateri11g, dome,stio and cullinary water be-
longing to and are the property of these objectors, and that all 
rights of these objectors in and to the said water be quieted as aG!'-"' 
inst every claim, right, title a.i1d interest of each and all olaiuante, 
and tha.t lfit1nie .-iaucl Irrigation Compo.ny and all othe,1• clai~1ants, and 
e&ch of then1, do not have any right, title or interest in and to the 
:said .. \l'Etters or water rights helo1,ging to the iia id l~1d and that these 
obJeotora are the owners and holders o:f the ea.id water and water righta 
HT000067 
001064 
• I 
.... , ,I 
\.._, 
-4-
:free and cl.ear of' all claims, rights and interest of any other person 
or parties, 
That the ~linuie 1:aud Irrigation Company and every other 
pereon or party or partie111 1 and ea.oh 0£ the111, eha.l.1 be perc1anently 
enjoined from setting up any olaj,m, right, title or interest in and 
to the waters belo11ging to the said land or any part thereof'. 
That tha objectors shall have such o·ther, further and 
di:f'f'arant relief', both .laga.1 and aqui tabla as n1ay be ll!eet in the 
premiee!I, 
J~ddress of' Objectors: 
Clive Sprouse & 1,!yrtl.e ?-Iae Sprouse 
nooeeve.l t, Utah 
Address of Objectors1 
Ui.lli3 Tia1mneremidt cl, Vilma Uamzaeramidt 
445 ~aet 1st South · 
Price, 'ITtah · 
ST..I.TE OF UTAll 
es 
County of' Carbon ) 
ttornay 
l3ono1no :auJ.lding 
rice, Utah 
lfILLIS l:Wll-.lERSHIDT, one of the Objectors above named, 
being duly sworn as follows: I am one of the objectors in the 
aboye entitled action, I have raad the foregoing objections and 
l.now ~he contents thereof and that the same ie true of ray own 
knowledge except a11 to r.iattere therein stated upon in:l:'orL,ation or 
bslie:t', a.r..d ae to those ;natters, .I believe it to be true, 
Subscribed and sworn to befo:!:'e me this 
of October, 1964, 
,,:y Commission Expires! 
Jan-q,ary 21, 1966 
,;;r day 
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Price, Utah 
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT-DUCHESNE 
IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GENERAL DETERMINATION OF 
WATER, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
HAMMERSCHMID TRUST, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) Case No. 560800056 
) 
) Transcript of: 
) 
) CROSS MOTIONS FOR 
) SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
) 
______________ ) 
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DUCHESNE 1 
EIGHTH DISTRICT COURT 
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P .0. BOX 990 
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NOVEMBER 24, 2015 
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1 water. She didn't care who Minnie Maude was or whether it 
2 existed. She said, huh-uh, I have got rights on that creek, 
3 and she won. She prevailed. So, again, the corporate 
4 existence was not an issue. 
5 Now, let's step back and just talk very briefly about 
6 what a general adjudication is. As the Court is aware, users 
7 on a system, on a drainage get involved in a general 
8 determination of the water rights on the entire source. It 
9 could be a river, it could be a lake, it could be springs, lots 
10 of sources. And the first thing that happens is the -- the 
11 claimants file their claims. 
12 The State Engineer goes out and does a field 
13 evaluation, creates hydrographic survey maps. We attached some 
14 to our memorandum, and I have got some blow-ups here. The 
15 State Engineer basically says, okay, you tell me you are 
16 irrigating a hundred acres with "X" amount of water. I'm going 
17 to go find out. Because, as the Court knows, beneficial use is 
18 the basis, the measure and the limit of a water right. Just 
19 because you have a piece of paper that says you can irrigate a 
20 hundred acres doesn't mean that's your water right. 
21 So the State Engineer does a map. He maps the 
22 sources. He maps the irrigated acres and figures out, okay, 
23 farmer "X" is actually only irrigating 80 acres, so that's what 
24 his water right is. Then the State Engineer creates, using 
25 maps and data -- this is the PD from this case. As you can see 
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1 it's a big piece of work. They all look like this, in various 
2 degrees of thickness. And he issues the PD and says this is 
3 what these water rights are, and if you disagree with it you 
4 have got 90 days to file an objection and you litigate. And 
5 that's what we are doing today. 
6 So Amber @Kehl and others object and say, no, you got 
7 everything right in that PD except the owner of the water 
8 right. There is no Minnie Maude. So it's important to 
9 recognize that for EnerVest and the Hammerschmids and the 
10 Mottes, who are opposing Carlsen, we are not seeking to undo 
11 anything. A decision in our favor on this motion in no way 
12 changes exactly how this water has been used in terms of 
13 amount, location, point of diversion, purpose of use, place of 
14 use. None of that changes. The PD got it all exactly right. 
15 Its only mistake was identifying Minnie Maude as the owner. 
16 So I have got some blow-ups I would like to walk the 
17 Court through. Your Honor, these are just easier-to-handle 
18 versions of the things I have got blown up. So this is an 
19 example , the first page of what I just handed you and what is 
20 on the easel is a -- let me explain one last thing about the 
21 PD. What you have is maps the State Engineer creates, and he 
22 will use hash marks to identify irrigated acres. We have 
23 outlined that here in green. The red are the actual deeds, 
24 property descriptions. You can see the irrigated acres are 
25 always within these red lines for the properties. 
25 
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1 
2 
So the State Engineer creates this map, and then 
THE COURT: So the little highlights in blue are the 
3 number of acres in that area that are under irrigation? 
4 
5 
6 
MR. WRIGHT: Urn, in the blue? No, those are 
THE COURT: I see a two and a two and a --
MR. WRIGHT: Yeah, they are all twos and threes. Let 
7 me -- let me -- I need to explain, basically, what we did. 
8 What we did, a PD, you think of it as a left side/right side 
9 book. You start here, and you read to the right across both 
10 pages. And so what the State Engineer does is takes the data 
11 from the maps and puts it in writing. So it will identify 
12 property owners, irrigated acres, amount of water, point of 
13 diversion, and all of that gets translated into writing in the 
14 book. 
15 And, for example, here point of diversion, property 
16 descriptions, they will match what's on the map. And purpose, 
17 extent and place of use. They will identify it by, you know, 
18 township, range, section, all that stuff, where you are using 
19 water, and how much you are using here, 10.6 acres, 5.4 acres. 
20 So that gets translated into writing. 
21 And then when we get to the maps -- I don't know that 
22 we have got the copies attached here -- but the maps work the 
23 same way. You can -- you can put them side by side. What we 
24 did in order to fit them on a blow-up page is we crunched two 
25 maps together. So you have got this is map 1 this is map 1, 
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1 this is map 2. They are crunched together, so you have a 
2 continuous picture of one particular set of users. So I'm 
3 trying to make this as clear as I can. It's a little 
4 confusing. 
5 But let's start with Carlsen. This map is a 
6 reflection of Carlsen's predecessors and the right that was 
7 authorized for use of water in the (inaudible). Now, if you 
8 look at one of their exhibits, Carlsen's exhibit, it's 
9 No. 10 -- or maybe that was we numbered it 10 -- but, anyway, 
10 it's a letter (inaudible), June of 2000. It's Carlsen's 
11 attempt, before any of this litigation ever starts, he writes 
12 the State Engineer and says I own 60 percent of the shares of 
13 Minnie Maude, and I want you to update title to these water 
14 rights in my name. Today it's called a report of conveyance. 
15 It is kind of a more-structured process than it used to be. 
16 But it is basically the same thing. 
17 He is saying I want to be identified as the owner of 
18 60 percent of all of the water rights (inaudible) in this PD. 
19 His argument is there was a Minnie Maude. I was issued shares. 
20 Or he wasn't issued, he purchased shares as a successor in 
21 interest. And Minnie Maude no longer exists. See, it has been 
22 dissolved in 1974. Under the law I get 60 percent of all its 
23 assets; i.e., water rights. And I will show you that letter. 
24 It's one of the blow-ups. 
25 So he says to the State Engineer update the title, 
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1 take Minnie Maude off, put me on, 60 percent of all of the 
2 water rights. But you have got to go back one step further in 
3 his chain of title. He didn't go back far enough. On the 
4 original hydrographic survey map you will see the name Glen 
5 Allred. That's Carlsen's predecessor. He traces his chain of 
6 title from Allred to Ernest Davis. We know who he is. He was 
7 the head of that litigation in the 50's. And then a chain down 
8 to Carlsen. 
9 He starts, when he submitted this stuff to the State 
10 Engineer in that June of 2000 letter he starts this chain of 
11 title with Davis, but that's not far back enough -- back far 
12 enough. You have got to go back to Allred. Allred owned this 
13 ground in red, and Allred was irrigating these green 
14 highlighted pieces, and those show up in the PD in written 
15 form, in very precise acreages, 10.9, 13.2, 12.59. There are 
16 some that are, you know, 2.3. There are very precise irrigated 
17 acreages. So that's where the -- the award process starts. 
18 Now, you go to the second page. This is the written 
19 translation of the map I just showed you. You will see water 
20 rights 197 and 299. They all have the same prefix. It's 90. 
21 And you will see it in the name of Minnie Maude Irrigation, 
22 care of Ernest Davis. And here is identified purpose, extent 
23 and place of use . By extent we are talking about irrigated 
24 acres. And again you see very precise, .6, .85. These are 
25 just little spots of land they were finding sufficient to 
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1 cultivate and irrigate. And Allred owned that ground. He then 
2 conveys to Ernest Davis, Davis down the chain to Carlsen. 
3 Now, for purposes of the argument, I have isolated 
4 just -- just four water rights, the EnerVest rights and the 
5 Carlsen rights, just to show a contrast. The Hamnerschrnid and 
6 Motte rights that are also relevant here today, the same 
7 situation. We are just -- we just didn't try to map those. 
8 So this is the 2000 -- June 2000 letter, excerpts of 
9 it, written to the State Engineer by Carlsen's attorney. First 
10 of all, they admit all they have been able to (inaudible) only 
11 2,377 shares were issued. These seven shareholders were all 
12 parties to the 1957 lawsuit. That's the same amount that's in 
13 the Articles of Incorporation. It's the same amount that 
14 Ernest Davis himself pleaded in that '57 litigation, he 
15 admitted only 2,377 shares were issued. This is Carlsen 
16 attempting to address the question, okay, the PD says Minnie 
17 Maude. There is no Minnie Maude. What do you do next? He is 
18 trying to get a resolution to that question. 
19 So if he starts this chain of title, and he explained 
20 to the State Engineer why he is entitled to 60.12 percent of 
21 all the water rights, he owns 60.12 percent of the shares of 
22 the would be Minnie Maude corporation. But he starts his chain 
23 of title with Ernest Gates, a deed, 1962, down t o Carlsen. 
24 Well, we have got the deed. 
25 It shows it starts with Allred, who owned the ground 
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1 when the deed was first issued, and he was the guy actually 
2 doing the irrigation. He was the guy that identified the 
3 plumb@ diversion. He is the guy that has put the water to 
4 beneficial use on ground he owns and that Carlsen has never 
5 owned, using water that Carlsen has never used. 
6 And then this is the ultimate remedy that Carlsen is 
7 seeking from the State Engineer and which he seeks today. This 
8 is what a judgment in his favor gets him. And we are going to 
9 show why it simply does not work. 
10 He says, "In light of the foregoing, would you please 
11 amend the Davis" -- I'm sorry -- "the Division's records to 
12 show Michael Carlsen as the owner of 60.12 percent of water 
13 right numbers 924, 184," etc., etc., all the way through. 
14 Those are all of the rights at issue before you today. 
15 EnerVest owns two of them, Mottes own some, Hammerschmids own 
16 three. 
17 What Mr. Carlsen is seeking is 60 percent of all the 
18 water awarded in the PD that was never used on any ground that 
19 he has ever owned, never used by any of his predecessors, 
20 always used by EnerVest and/or its predecessors or Hammerschmid 
21 and their predecessors or Mottes or their predecessors, on 
22 ground that they own and only they have ever owned. In other 
23 words, he wants to reach across the entire award and grab 
24 60 percent of EnerVest's right, 60 percent of Mottes', 
25 60 percent of Hammerschmids', 60 percent of everybody that's in 
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1 MR. WRIGHT: He might have. He might have had the 
2 Articles of Incorporation. He might have had all kinds of 
3 evidence of corporate existence. But what he didn't do and 
4 what he had no authority to do was decide whether Minnie Maude 
5 actually existed. That's a question ripe for the Court. 
6 THE COURT: As far as whether they thought Minnie 
7 Maude owned it, that deed would make it seem pretty clear? 
8 MR. WRIGHT: Yes, yes, yes. And -- and Ernest Davis 
9 may have taken that to him and said, see, Minnie Maude owns --
10 owns these rights. And the State Engineer isn't the officer to 
11 make that determination, that decision in the 50's litigation. 
12 So Ernest Davis, maybe he wants to get out ahead of the PD and 
13 say, I am going to file this case. We are going to get this 
14 question of Minnie Maude's existence resolved one way or 
15 another, and then we will go forward. It gets stayed 
16 THE COURT: How does the PD show -- so on these maps 
17 and on the books, the PD would show the owner of the land being 
18 the individual landowners --
19 
20 
MR. WRIGHT: Correct. 
THE COURT: -- it would show the owner of the water 
21 right being Minnie Maude, and then it would show the amount of 
22 land irrigated and the volume and the flow rates. 
23 
24 
25 
MR. WRIGHT: Exactly. 
THE COURT: (Inaudible) Minnie Maude is the owner 
MR. WRIGHT: Except on the maps. You are right 
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1 except on the maps. On the maps I just showed you Allred is 
2 the owner . And there are other -- there is another map that 
3 also identifies. Let me just get to that. 
4 THE COURT: (Inaudible) the PD identifies Minnie 
5 Maude as the owner? 
6 MR. WRIGHT: Yes. Despite the fact that on the maps 
7 it identifies actual property owners. Here is Thomas A. 
8 Christensen. He is EnerVest, predecessor of EnerVest. This is 
9 the EnerVest version of the map. Again, two maps shoved 
10 together just for convenience purposes. You have irrigated 
11 acres in precise determinations, 2.4, 6.6. 
12 These water rights are approved for use only on this 
13 property and only in these amounts, and these water rights are 
14 not approved for use anywhere on any property owned by Carlsen 
15 or any of his predecessors. That's the disconnect. That's 
16 the -- that's the square peg/round hole that's going on in the 
17 PD is he identifies property owners on maps, says this is what 
18 you can use, and in no way blends them, in no way does the PD 
19 says Carlsen's predecessor, Allred, can use some of the water 
20 on Christensen's ground or vice versa. It onl y authorizes the 
21 use of the water on very specific properties, and it is 
22 undisputed who has owned them, it is undisputed who has 
23 actually put the water to beneficial use, where and for how 
24 long and for what purpose. 
25 Again, somehow, for some reason, the PD, when it gets 
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1 
2 
C E R T I F I C A T E 
3 I, BRAD J. YOUNG, hereby certify that I transcribed 
4 the electronic recording of the proceedings in the above-
s entitled and numbered matter and that the foregoing is a true 
6 and correct transcription, except where it is indicated that 
7 the recording was inaudible, to the best of my understanding, 
8 skill and ability on said date. 
9 Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 18th day of June, 
10 2016. 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
BRAD() G 
COURT REPORTER 
86 
002212 
·- -,- -----
' .. 
• I 
I 
.. 
.1 
--- --D 
~ 
---
A 
. 
. 
" 
. 
" 
. 
.. 
0 . 
i 
-
" 
" .. 
.. 
. 
.. 
~ 
C 
D 
.. 
·-== ..
.. : 
_;z 
1:i1 DETtP.MlNI\T!CN OF WI\ TER R IGHTS, UTNTAH 8AS!N A~D i.O.vtR .CR.ED< JI.IVU\ BASn,.' 
CARBO!'I, DAGC1TT:. 0Ul:f1t:SNf., fMtRY, GAANDi UINTAH ANO WAUTCHCOUNTE·, UT AH 
Cl.AIM 
NO. NAMt C. AOORrSS 01 CLAIMANT Sot.11\CE t TYPE. Of UGHT l l'RIO\ITY DATE new C . F . &. POINT Of' CIVER.$!Gl 
nu (Oavis;~ 
~t!,"t1U~'v1~ Prie•, u-:~ 
1059 f Wt""1 Stun or Aroer..C.a. II>.#.,,. .. ,;,f L:IOO Mam.C"Dli!llt 
1', 0. BQ1l 1n . 
S~h l..\i<c City, lJu.h 
N!JICWJlc Crcck, O!!Jt:.e.~c,a 
M•P 3So•e 
N.m! Mile. en:~, Dil1t4!1!C.<1! 
M.tp ~SG-c 
S;.~t1=~~~" ; ~rs.!:"17.'n~. 
f!!!~ ¥fi;1 J~e~~;rs, Jt~4~$'".Mt.f' 
ISM.k water d.!r'ectly OD 1t,c• m -frorn ('Ofot 
wme ltte:am c:.M:a, N',11!N£t ~c. 7, Ti2.S, 
1
~itJ~ .. ~:: ~~ ~i;.-~~::LB~~rn .. , 
P£it1d:J Of USE, !nerulh-c 
,,,-:Cf!-1 TO· 
Jaia..1 Dte, l l 
J=l Oct,. IS 
F.UM t£ADCA~~~Eifi@'~OM $OIU\C£ 
Ac.IT. AC.IT, 
l\l!m""l<s 
'" R .. ,..,.,.a 
CAJl~~l)~~~l~ c~:J.~,1}~~ ~~=A:c~~~_fl~~~:~!~AH 
?'!rf!Po.<t , EXITNT , J'µCf.Of' rr.E CLA!MS 1,15[0 f(ll PU'RPC6t OLsCP..[MJ) .,.,, .. , 
STOCKWATElUNGi m ~1:1\(6 ~~;~~~Et~~~~ ~!:s u';:~. 'ctJ:~;,r;,~~1"ntl ~{Ei~1tfi0ne:~ '!l!1~~1:7'~,. ... 1;=d 
~·.-oc:1<·w,u,.R1Nu, f~~A~i}!!~-..~;/;:~N!!~,itl 
~f. Ct.Al}l.ts USED fell. PURPOSE. DtSCRm;;J 
f"<r Claim , Uicd foll Puz:pox: 
Duc:r!bed R a W al:er O"wr•s Clal.i1l 
l057, P~e !O~. 
Divcnfoo ~·, c&.d:., IZ a lJ cl&.im.1. T«:a.1 
"{eilll"fy- .;.ive."U011J w.du a.ll clab:1 mentioned 
27,6Ciac. fl. 
,,. 
a.AIM 
NO. 
]0551 
1.97 Mlonle Ma.....!• Inl;g..rfoa C.omp~ - -;;,,..., Mude Cnek. Dlllg"IK"., 1886 l.O ~. !JOO ft. W, .]i70 ~. :fro=, !¼ coe. S...c · Ard). l Oct. J I s,.,. llUtIC~TION: 1. 70 il<'.."t, Let. 8, 4.60 •cs. lQt 7 Srs,;.,3 ~ - --. -,-,,-. ·-:·:· ;;-
" ·&ae,! O::.vb .Sc• 7, "fl"ZS, Rl4E., SLBQA . R,o,mul« Rl-tl!. Sl.Bf,M, 14 . JT >.a, . SlJNl:t, r.J , 0 aa, $Wt,'."E¼l.5 . :0 a.c1. 
Ni- WJ1e via Prloc, UtUt 386 lt..D".lll"lcl ~~J1ilY'J! ~~~ ~ . SVt-lNW¼, 3,,155 :t.~. ~¼'SW¼."'-"~,. 
~¾rmi.~ ?:tl:, d!,•ernd at .a:iyJ eadl, I 1$17 &1~::Jt:ze:t~!i;t~i:1:.v.:.t Motp -c fl"~ . Mc~ wTf.2~~-1M4!d.~Ift~l,\f~~.N~m~1, 
~:x?:~!°~:&it::;::;; TUS; Rl 1 ;~.It d;:,~~"l "~' -.!! cl:t.'.m! IMllO')IICd 
·-
,;-,-...... .,.,_,. . 
Sn S.40 ~cs. SWfNE¼, 9 . ZO ;.a. SW1:."tll Sec . S, n2s. Rl«, ~ 2Sl9, J(Y.), lOL 19·1 Di,'C.:"!iar nq, aa:i, et .n d ah r.1 . TQtal 
R.am:..rk. SUCM , w t uh l 1.cre,ir o! J.1, ,«l, -r~"'"·ly d!.W=r~ .. iaa<k,! •-U chlm, <U"1ltlOJJoO"d . 
SE;:;CLAIMS USED f ell. Pl»tPOSf Dl:SCRlllfD ___ __ ?,:;·:,"°:....:,"::_· ,::l•.'---------- ---1 
Aprtl 1 Cr:t, 3J Se<'! STOCKWATntlNG: 1021 c ;a.ttl~ ll.lloi h«u,. 2720 she<iP. Fr;,r CbJ.m.1 ~d fa Fc:!pc,n, Duct!bl'd Jl~ ~ tli·~ fu.'"p-:tr!'I h ~,t of fl~!~ ,,tiJ«tion 
Rem..-~ SE.[ C:.A[lt,.ts.mIDfCllPURJ'a.E:0ESCRlllED S<I~ \li'1t.lu lhn's Cla.!m 2-1., Paf!> i.04. Dlve 11lor. :a:q. ~~ , or • ll cl.c~,. T~U 
yo,a,Jy du..,:•tom ~: all ci:1hn1 Tnr!teO=d 
2~ I Y.tiwe Made l-rig azi01> Comp••'( 
'f{ En.est D:ill'it 
Nine M i le via. Ptfe,e; , Ub.h 
Mi.llu.ie Ma1t,;.1,;, Co!..._, n..U.i;crux 
11.BS I f~O I~; .}~:.\~ri,1~~-i.&om£¼CQ1:.Se~ .1 At--il l 
R.e-uiatki 
.~.82 ...:;, ft . 
, .. 
Rur.<>rkl 
w~~~te:,i,t t,_ 1-'lt.e.: !)f u,c 1'-C W~ r rr,.,, .. O e.lm f01 CJ~ ... , US"d fQ! ro;r~ °"'cri~:i Sl\lnl!I fl.c,v,, ir.i:a:11.1:tt....c.L'y dho-5""ted U :I.JlfJ '-ao,I 2S~ 
l97 l lrc£d a "'· _ . u~v:at~ \J$'"'r'i C:hl:n -J71 Un "'<I :.~~85~ :t"f~3",l;1~l~~ ~~n 1')' 
,.. 
~~!\ ~;.sA, 
Moe, Ut.Ji 
M.ap386 -c 
Nine W.ili, Creak, Oilftena 
M:o.pU.6 -<l 
18:l!S . ~~. ~~r:!~~Nil?Wl~r:c~? .~t 
"l~~ ~~!Jr~~¾°s::c7;r1r"f2S, 
JArt. ] 
~c.31 ,_ 
J,..,mub 
'"'· """"'· I I I 10S8 UllitedSr.ue:a oJAm,m.,,. . ~i= Mlii:Crc..:,k, Dt!igct".CIL 18SS St.:-c,kw;..to;~<li!'cedy® str.::a m -fr(...,rO:lr>t ~l Oct.JS - -
STOCKW-•TERJ.NC... ~1crz~::tte~~'aJ7~~tbt:S:CltIBW :::!:u Us~~ ~r._;.,~ 2.-4, ra; ,o:c.r. 11 i~.·=r:--1~~1!: sec W'Lttt Uret'a Clum 
.STOCK\'fJ\Tf.RING: m~l~~J,'Fa\ FURl'OSE DESC~ffifJ S, 3RZ, .:i!il, :\84, ~tl.S, l l'll'.i 
STOCKWAT?RlNC , :~~:if1!!;:~1;.;~:t~-y;~t1tl 
Siil CL/\IMS USED rCR PURPCS£DtsCR.I!E0 
C~U~"°?:;f'lr.°l.-'IX\I 
O..:olbl!d $0:4' W• ter U$1.t'$ Clll.!rn 
1[·51, Pair:103, 
l~i{!i!~ ":i~ i~ ~j~":;,;.l::.,~ 
rDi._-,i,;,,a. a:iy, udi, .... at ..111.JN. fQtil !]~i !~.,;:~oa ~, :.l.! d&!cn mc.nioncd 
. tJ~:f 21! ::rm•ut -~l• J~ ~c Rr!~~ l~f'!~ i~r~1EttiJ: 
. ' R 1-4-E, Sl.B.:-~. ·- - --+- -.....1.-- -.....1.- ---..J...----~------ -··----·----··--- ·---'--------- -~--
'" 
lOSS 
/> .. 
.. .#' . .( 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN· 
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Attornqs at Ul1lJ 
June 28, 2000 
HAND-DEL:CVERED 
Utah Division of Water ~ights 
1594 West North Temple, Suite 220. 
Sa.lt Lake City, UT B.4114 
... --, ... 
DANIE!. A. JENSEN 
Re: Minnie Maud Reservoir and Irrigation Company 
Water Right Nos. 90-24, 90-184, 90-18S, 
90-196, 90-1~7, 90-188, ~0-189, 90-190,. 
90-191, 90"196, 90-197 and 90-299 
Ladies and Gentlemen: 
Based on discussions with Jim Riley, I am submitting this 
request to update your records regarding ownership of a portion of 
the . water rights now listed in the name of the Minnie Maude 
Irrigation Company, which rights allow diversion and use of water 
from Minnie Maud Creek {aiso known as Nine Mile Creek) in Carbon 
County. 
Th~ follow:j.ng facts are taken from (1) the Articles of 
Agreement of Incorporation of the Minnie Maud Reservoir and 
Irrigation Company, and (2) a Compl.aint filed by Ernest E. Davis, 
Jr. on May 4, -1957 in the Seventh Judicial District Court for 
Carbon County to resolve .an ownership dispute over the use of water 
rights owned by the Minnie Maud Reservoir and Irr:i,gatio:h Com~any 
(see attached copie~). The M:i,nnie Maud Reservoir and Irrigation 
Company .(the "Company") was organized as a, Utah corporation ·on 
March 27, 1902. The Company's water rights came from conveyances 
of the orig~nal shareholders' ·water rights in Minnie Maud Creek. 
The company issued 2,377 sha~es of stock and, as of 1957, the 
Company had seven shareholders with ownership as follows:. 
Ernest E. Pavis , Jr: 
Thomas Chris.tensen 
Bud Christensen 
T .. F. Housekeeper 
Amber Keel 
Louis Motte 
Bernard lriart 
TOTAL 
1,429 shares 
199½.shares 
199½.shares 
260·shares 
18_2 shares 
68 shares 
39 shares 
2,377 shares 
These seven shareholders were all parties to . the 1957 lawsui.t. 
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water rights and water shares formerly owned by the Davis family 
{and thereafter by the- Wimmer family) . On June 27, 200·0 I filed 
with yol!-Z' office five Reports of Water Right Conveyance documenting 
the transt:er of title from the Wimmers to Mr. Carlson. Those 
Reports .and the deeds described pelow (see attached copies) show 
that the water rights corresponding to 1,4·29 of the 2,377 t<;>tal 
issued shares of . the Company, or 60.12% (i.e. the Davis shares), 
are now held by Mr. Carlson: 
Warranty Deed d~ted November 12, 1962 from Ernest Davis, Jr., 
Olive M. Davis, Devon Davis and Jean R. Davis to W-M Ranches, 
Inc. (recorded in Carbon County at Book 81, page 274). This 
deed expressly transfers 1,429 shares of the Compa,ny to W-M 
Ranches, Inc. 
Quit-Cl~imDeed dated August 1, 1968 from W-M Ranches, Inc. to 
Neville L. Wimmer aI;J.d Harold J. Wimmer (recorded in Carbon· 
County at Book 186, page 471). This deed expressly transfers 
1,429 shares of the Company to Neville L. Wimmer and Harold J, 
Wimmer. · 
[':):'he five Reports of wa'ter Right Conveyance filed by Mr. 
Carlson on June 27, 2000 dooument various conveyances of the 
subject lan.d and all appurtenan,:. water rights from Neville L. 
Wimmer and Harold J. Wimmer (both of whom are now deceased) to 
Lily Mae Wimmer, trustee.] 
Warranty Deed dated July 27, 1998 from Lily Mae Wirome:r, 
successor trustee of t~e Neville~- Wimmer Revocable Trust 
dated June 11, 1981, to Michael M. Carlson (recorded in Carbon 
County at Book 414, page 129)'. This deed transfers ·the 
subject property and all appurtena~t water rights, including 
"all of Grantor's interest in the Minnie Maud Reservoir and 
Irrigation Company and the water rights owned or used by said 
company, all shares of said compar,i.y owned by Granter or to 
which Granter is entitled, and any interest owned by Grantor 
or to which Grantor is entitled in. the water rights and other 
assets of said company now held by said company or arising 
from any termination or liquidation of said company, past or 
present, formal, informal or · defact,o. n 
Special Warranty Deed dated July 21, 1998 from Lily Mae 
Wimmer; successor trustee of the Neville'L. Wimmer Revocable 
Trust dated June 11, 1981, to Michael M. Carlson (recorded in 
Carbon ~ounty at Book 414, page 132). This deed transfers 
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various water rights appurtenant t9 the subject property, 
including water right Nos. 90-24, 9Q-184, 90-185, 90-186, 90-
187, 90-188, 90-18"9, 90-190, 90-191, 90-196, . 90-197 and 90-
299, which are all of the water·rights listed in the Proposed 
I)etermination as being owned by Minnie Maude Irrigation 
Company. 
In light of the foregoing, would you please amend the 
Di vision's records. to show Michael M. Carlson as the owner of 
60 .12% of water right Nos. 90-24, 90-184., 90-:J-85, 90-186, .90-187, 
90-188, .90-189, 90-190, 90-191, 90-196, 90-197 and 90-299. Would 
you. also please p::r:epi;ire segregation filings to segregate Mr . 
Carlson's portion of thoi;,e rights from the Company's portion. 
Finally, please send me copies . of the segregation· filings and 
wrihten confirmation of the ownership changes as soon .as they have 
been completed. Mr. Carlson's address is: · · 
Michael M. Carlson 
14800 South 1300 West 
Bluffdale, UT 84065 
This request is being submitted. prior to the effective date of 
the Division's new Report of Water Right Conveyance rule, so I have 
not prepared a Report of Water Right Conveyance. Given the unusual 
hist·ory of these corporate rights, a standard Report of Water Right 
Conveyance form would not fit well anyway. This narrative 
explanation is provided instead. 
Should you need any additional information, please let me 
know. Thank_ you for your help. 
DAJ/ca 
Enclosures · 
cc: Michael M. Carlson 
Very truly yours, 
f}Ni[)_~ 
Daniel A. Jensen 
Attorney for -Michael ·M. Carlson 
__ ..,.-' ·,,..,,. _______________________________________ , 
~· 
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